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Abstract 
Managers and academics have historically paid little attention to pricing. To set 
the right price is the fastest and most effective way for a company to maximize 
profits. Therefore, it is surprising that it has received limited interest. The main 
focus of our study is to examine suppliers’ ability to gain price premiums through 
factors that influence performance ambiguity and branding investments. We apply 
a business-to-business context in the Norwegian Occupational Health Services 
(OHS) market. This market is characterized by services that are hard to evaluate, 
due to intangible properties. Consequently, buyers have problems distinguishing 
between high-quality providers and low-quality providers. This is labeled as 
performance ambiguity. In the study, we address two types of OHS units: 
companies that offer OHS service themselves (make) and companies that 
purchase OHS services from other units (buy). We use the terms internal OHS 
units (make) and external OHS units (buy) throughout the thesis. We develop a 
conceptual model that we empirically test, with a sample of 161 OHS units in a 
quantitative setting.  
 
The results from our study show that buyers exist that are willing to pay a price 
premium to overcome the problems of performance ambiguity. Furthermore, our 
findings indicate that switching costs and environmental uncertainty have a 
significant effect on reducing performance ambiguity, and thereby contribute to 
sellers’ ability to charge price premiums. Contrary to our expectations, brand 
investments do not have an indirect effect on price premium through brand 
credibility. Furthermore, signaling brand credibility does not have a significant 
effect on sellers’ propensity to gain price premiums. A possible explanation is that 
OHS units spend limited resources on marketing efforts. For internal OHS units 
only environmental uncertainty has an effect on reducing performance ambiguity. 
This may be due to a lack of perceived competition, and the organization structure 
in itself.        
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
In the following chapter we present the background for the study and current 
research on price premiums. We develop a problem definition and discuss 
contributions and limitations, before looking into the properties of the Norwegian 
Occupational Health Services market.  
 
1.1 Background for the study and current research on price premiums 
The background for the study is the new law regulations that were amended on 
1.1.2010. These new regulations require new branches of the Norwegian industry 
to offer Occupational Health Services (OHS) to their employees. The focus of the 
study is to investigate how OHS units can gain price premiums. Throughout the 
paper, we examine this phenomenon from the business-to-business market 
perspective. In the study, we address two types of OHS units: companies that 
offer OHS service themselves (make) and companies that purchase OHS services 
from other units (buy). We use the terms internal OHS units (make) and external 
OHS units (buy) throughout the thesis. This is consistent with transaction cost 
theory proposed by Williamson (1975). OHS units have traditionally paid little 
attention to marketing their services (Meeting with NIOH, 23.6.2010). 
Nevertheless, in recent years, OHS units face increased competition with larger 
private-owned players entering the market (Lie 2009). As such, we investigate 
which factors influence price premiums.  
 
Current research proposes different strategies and methods on how to achieve 
price premiums. Most of the literature on how to charge price premiums is related 
to quality, reputation and uncertainty. Rao and Monroe (1996) argue that 
delivering high product quality as a strategy can provide sellers with the ability to 
charge price premiums. They further argue that charging a price premium may be 
used as a signal to solve problems related to moral hazard. When moral hazard is 
present, Monroe (2003, 86) proposes that it can be solved by offering incentives 
such as quality signals. Buyers can then pay a price premium in order to receive 
the level of quality desired. The more the buyers are concerned about quality, the 
greater their willingness to pay price premiums. Klein and Leffler (1981) also 
study the link between quality and price premium. However, they incorporate the 
effect of reputation on price premium. They argue that under some conditions, 
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sellers can charge a price premium that is higher than the minimum average cost 
of high quality. Price premium can be thought of as “protection money” paid by 
buyers to secure performance, and thereby reduce uncertainty around the 
transaction. Also, Klein and Leffler (1981) investigate the link between 
punishment and price premium. If a seller wishes to cheat customers, the ultimate 
punishment they receive is that the buyer stops purchasing their services. 
Furthermore, they argue that sellers with a positive reputation receive a price 
premium as a return on their investments. This is further supported by Shapiro 
(1982, 1983). 
 
Rao and Bergen (1992) study the link between quality, reputation and information 
asymmetry in relation with price premium. Some buyers are willing to pay a price 
premium in order to ensure that the promised quality of a product is delivered. 
They further argue that the logic for price premiums is information asymmetry. 
Under conditions of uncertainty, buyers may pay a price premium in order to 
prevent sellers from cheating on quality. However, buyers’ willingness to pay 
price premiums for quality declines when a seller has a reputation for good 
quality, as buyers trust the quality delivered from sellers. This contrasts with the 
findings of Klein and Leffler (1981) and Shapiro (1982, 1983). 
 
Nelson (1970) investigates the link between uncertainty and price premium and 
the fact that buyers are likely to pay a price premium for services where the 
quality cannot be discovered before purchase. Mishra, Heide and Cort (1998) also 
find that price premium is a function of information asymmetry. The less 
information available to buyers the greater the required price premium. Lastly, 
when focusing on the link between branding and price premium, Erdem, Swait 
and Louviere (2002) find that the effect of investing in brand credibility should be 
that companies gain a price premium. 
 
1.2 Problem definition 
Price has historically been one of the least understood and most underutilized 
marketing tools in organizations (Morris, Avila, and Pitt 1996). It is where 
marketers feel the most pressure to perform and where they are least certain that 
they do a good job. Smith et al. (1999) agree that pricing is the biggest marketing 
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headache for managers, as it is difficult to set objectives and measure results. 
Furthermore, Smith et al. (1999) argue that a slight change in the pricing strategy 
of a company can lead to tremendous consequences. To set the right price is 
essential, as it is the fastest and most effective way for a company to realize its 
maximum profits. Thus, it is crucial to gain control over the pricing functions. 
However, Morris, Avila and Pitt (1996) argue that managers have tended to view 
price by focusing on margins and cost, and not as a strategic marketing variable.  
 
Within pricing strategies, we address price premiums in our study. Price premium 
is defined as: “the difference between the super-high price and the perfectly 
competitive price for high-quality output” (Rao and Monroe 1996, 512). It has 
been found that because of information asymmetry, a buyer may allow the seller 
to charge a higher price to reduce the level of uncertainty (Akerlof 1970). Snow 
(2010) argues that due to performance ambiguity, some are willing to pay for 
information, thus reducing the level of uncertainty. According to Lie (2009), the 
Norwegian Institute of Occupational Health (NIOH) experience that the majority 
of buyers of OHS services are not able to distinguish between effective OHS units 
and “charlatans”. This creates a degree of performance ambiguity in the OHS 
market. Rao and Bergen (1992) show that under conditions of uncertainty and 
complexity, buyers may knowingly pay price premiums to sellers in order to 
prevent them from cheating on quality. In addition, quality-seeking buyers are 
more likely to pay a price premium for services whose quality cannot be 
ascertained prior to purchase (Nelson 1970). Price premiums can therefore play a 
key role in the OHS market. However, price premiums can only be achieved if 
one develops a better understanding of which factors influence the likelihood of 
sellers receiving price premiums. In this respect, we propose the following 
problem definition: 
 
Which factors in the OHS market contribute to suppliers’ ability to gain price 
premiums in a market influenced by performance ambiguity?  
 
1.3 Contributions 
Hinterhuber (2004) finds that pricing has received limited attention by academics.  
As such, our study contributes to the under-studied area of pricing. Furthermore, 
research has shown contradictory results of various factors on price premiums 
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(Shapiro 1982, 1983; Rao and Monroe 1996; Klein and Leffler 1981; Rao and 
Bergen 1992; Nelson 1970; Mishra, Heide, and Cort 1998; Erdem, Swait, and 
Louviere 2002). Therefore, we contribute to further theoretical and managerial 
comprehension of factors influencing the construct price premium. Monroe (2003, 
3) argues that managers make bad pricing decisions because they rely on invalid 
assumptions about their customers, their competitors or inadequate and incorrect 
information. As such, our study aims to provide managers with a better foundation 
regarding decisions that can be used to obtain price premiums. Our study also 
gives a better understanding of factors that have an impact on performance 
ambiguity, and how managers can utilize factors to reduce performance ambiguity 
in connection with price premium. Lastly, we contribute to transaction cost theory 
by examining make or buy decisions linked with performance ambiguity and price 
premiums.  
 
1.4 Limitations 
This thesis has some limitations in relation to the range of the study. First, the 
thesis is limited to a national setting. The focus is therefore restricted to a 
Norwegian setting and not an international setting. Furthermore, we only 
investigate one market, the OHS market. Within the OHS market we limit our 
study by only collecting responses from managers of OHS units. Also, there exist 
several definitions of the concept price premium, however in the thesis we follow 
Rao and Monroe’s (1996) definition. These limitations are deliberately 
incorporated in our work to set the scope and provide guidelines for the thesis.  
 
1.5 Properties of the Occupational Health Services market 
The OHS market in the Norwegian setting has undergone vast changes (Lie 2009). 
The modern OHS supplier dates back to 1977, when the Work Environment Act 
was passed (Lie 2009). Norwegian work environment legislation, aligned with 
rules and regulations in the European Union, make up the framework for the 
market. The regulation states: 1) The employer is responsible for having an OHS 
in place and assessing the quality of the OHS personnel, and 2) Describes the 
types of services companies should require of an OHS. In Norway, two ministries 
are involved: the Ministry of Labor and Social Inclusion and the Ministry of 
Health and Welfare (Meeting with NIOH, 23.6.2010). 
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Browsing the OHS market is a complex task. The market is multidisciplinary, 
meaning that some OHS units provide services to many companies. Both internal 
and external OHS units make up the market. In an European context, Norwegian 
OHS units are relatively small, with an average of four full-time OHS 
professionals covering 2000 employees (Lie 2009). The OHS registry, published 
by NIOH, provides the closest estimate of number of players in the market. Now, 
around 410 OHS units employ some 2500 professionals (NIOH 2010). It should 
be noted that the registry is voluntarily and therefore not completely accurate 
(Meeting with NIOH, 23.6.2010). 
 
As mentioned, Norwegian OHS units focus little on marketing of its services, but 
focus on competing on price (Meeting with NIOH, 23.6.2010). The reason for this 
might be that law regulates the market. Recently, two trends have developed in the 
market: 1) OHS units merge, and as such larger players enters the market, and 2) 
The OHS units and market as a whole moves towards commercialization (Lie 
2009). Hence, marketing and pricing structures become more important. Lately, 
pricing structures have moved towards a basic price and a price by the hour 
(Meeting with NIOH, 23.6.2010). These trends have led to an increase in 
competition in the market. In order to stay competitive OHS units have started to 
change their organizational structure from non-profit organizations to private 
companies (Lie 2009).  
 
As of 1.1.2010, two new regulations were introduced. Firstly, the introduction of 
accreditation of providers of OHS, and secondly the introduction of industry 
regulation for new sectors of the Norwegian market (Norwegian Labour 
Inspection Authority 2010). New sectors that are required to offer OHS services to 
their employees include, amongst others, education, health care and hairdressers 
(Norwegian Labour Inspection Authority 2010). Severe changes will occur in the 
marketplace due to these law amendments. International players and franchise 
units are likely to enter the market (Meeting with NIOH, 23.6.2010). OHS units 
operating in the market now fear this competition. Traditionally, OHS units have 
not considered competition as a major threat. Therefore, they are likely to oppose 
these changes. In addition, the OHS units have not conveyed their added value to 
their customers. They have focused on price, presenting it as the lowest possible 
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cost for buyers. As such, the focus has only been on price and not on quality 
(Meeting with NIOH, 23.6.2010). 
 
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows: The following chapter presents the 
relevant literature connected with our study. We then discuss the dependent and 
independent variables, with hypotheses that together make up our research model. 
Thereafter, we propose the research methodology, before presenting the data 
analysis. Next we describe the results from the structural equation model and 
perform hypotheses testing. Subsequently, we discuss the findings of the study, 
and its implications for theory and managerial practice. We conclude by 
highlighting the limitations of our study, and provide possible areas for future 
research.         
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Chapter 2 Literature review 
In the following chapter we present the relevant literature connected with our 
study. We examine performance ambiguity and information asymmetry before 
addressing transaction cost theory.  
 
2.1 Performance Ambiguity   
Ellsberg (1961) was one of the first to discuss ambiguity in an economical setting. 
It refers to something vague or unsure, and is often mentioned in connection with 
uncertainty of information. Snow (2010, 133) builds upon Ellsberg’s research and 
proposes the following definition of ambiguity: “uncertainty about probability, 
created by missing information that is relevant and could be known”. Mishra, 
Heide and Cort (1998, 283) provide a more accurate definition of performance 
ambiguity: “the difficulties faced by the customers in evaluating a service 
offering”. Snow (2010) argues that there exists ambiguity averters that are willing 
to pay for information that reduces ambiguity. Nelson (1970) discusses ambiguity 
in relation with determining quality of products. He postulates that quality is 
among the more difficult types of information to evaluate. Ambiguity creates 
uncertainty for customers. Such problems are likely to be found in the OHS 
market, consisting of different providers with services that can be challenging to 
evaluate (Lie 2009). Often, consumers are risk averse and tend to choose higher-
priced alternatives in order to reduce the level of uncertainty (Zeithaml 1988). We 
address this type of difficulty in relation with OHS services throughout the paper 
as performance ambiguity. 
 
Signaling is an important mechanism that may be used in order to overcome 
problems with performance ambiguity (Spence 2002). It can also be used to 
distinguish low-quality providers from high-quality providers (Kirmani and Rao 
2000). A signal is defined as: “an action that the seller can take to convey 
information credibly about unobservable quality to the buyer” (Rao, Lu, and 
Ruekert 1999, 259). Serious actors might unravel problems related to performance 
ambiguity in connection with information asymmetry and adverse selection 
through signaling.  
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Lie (2009) states that the OHS market is moving towards a free market 
characterized by increasing competition between service providers. Accordingly, 
signaling might be used to reduce performance ambiguity by communicating the 
accurate quality provided by an OHS unit. 
 
Signaling to reduce the level of performance ambiguity can be transmitted in 
many forms like brand name, price or advertising expenditures (Kirmani and Rao 
2000). This is further supported by Erdem and Swait (1998) who argue that 
brands can be used as a signal mechanism in order to reduce customers’ ambiguity 
related to purchases. Consequently, signaling can be used as an instrument to 
differentiate from competitors (Grant 2010; Porter 1996). Traditionally, signaling 
through marketing efforts has not been widely used in the OHS market (Meeting 
with NIOH, 23.6.2010). 
 
2.1.1 Information Asymmetry  
Information asymmetry can be described as one party acquiring more or better 
information than the other in a given transaction (Akerlof 1970; Lützkendorf and 
Speer 2005; Husted 2007). Akerlof (1970) discusses how some car sellers have 
more knowledge about the product than the buyers, making it problematic for 
buyers to separate between high and low-quality cars. Akerlof (1970) concludes 
that information asymmetry exists in the marketplace, therefore it can be argued 
that a perfect market does not exist. However, Darby and Karni (1973) claim that 
the closest one can get to a perfect market is the market for search services, as 
consumers can easily evaluate such services. Credence services on the other hand 
are more difficult to evaluate. As a consequence, information asymmetry is more 
distinctive in markets with experience and credence services. This is because it is 
not necessarily possible to evaluate the service, even after purchase and 
consumption (Darby and Karni 1973). In addition, Urbany, Dickson and 
Kalapurakal (1996) find that customers do not inform themselves fully about 
prices, as searching in the market is costly.  
 
Sellers competing in the marketplace can solve the problem of information 
asymmetry by the use of signaling to communicate their offerings (Kirmani and 
Rao 2000). In general, the more intangible a service is, the greater the information 
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asymmetry between the company and its customers (Skaggs and Snow 2004). 
Because OHS services are hard to evaluate and intangible, NIOH together with 
the Labor Inspectorate developed a quality assurance system named “Good 
Occupational Health Services” (Lie 2009). This evaluation system can be seen 
upon as a tool for reducing performance ambiguity for buyers in the OHS 
marketplace.  
 
In order to fully understanding the underlying concept of information asymmetry 
the following table is proposed by Husted (2007) (Table 1):  
 
 
 
As we see from Table 1, information asymmetry can occur in two different 
settings: adverse selection and moral hazard. The rationale behind adverse 
selection is that customers are not always able to detect good quality from bad 
quality as they have access to different information. Also, the buyers will have 
difficulty distinguishing between high and low-quality products (Mishra, Heide, 
and Cort 1998). These properties are present in the OHS market, with a 
multidisciplinary and complex structure (Lie 2009). As a consequence, adverse 
selection issues might occur in the market of study.  
 
When asymmetric information exists in a market, it is likely that the customers 
select the bad products instead of the good products. Akerlof (1970) examined this 
when he studied the health insurance industry. Thus, adverse selection states 
whether a seller possess the skills required to acquire a certain quality or not 
(Akerlof 1970). In the OHS market there can be buyers without the required skills 
for evaluating quality, substantiating the presence of adverse selection issues in 
the market. Over time however, customers are likely to discover the intentions of 
sellers’ dishonesties. This might result in a negative impact on a seller’s 
reputation (Erdem and Swait 1998). According to Husted (2007) adverse selection 
occurs before contract agreement and the motives between the relationship (buyer 
Table 1: Information asymmetry
Incomplete Complete
Asymmetric 
Adverse selection Moral hazard
Symmetric
Incomplete and symmetric information No information problem
Information Completeness
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
as
ym
m
et
ry
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and seller) is hidden in an attempt to obtain a resource. In such situations, 
information is both asymmetric and incomplete.  
 
To overcome the problem with adverse selection, the sellers can use signaling, 
which sheds light on the information about the product characteristics (Mishra, 
Heide, and Cort 1998). The “Good Occupational Health Services” evaluation 
system is an example of a signal intended to overcome adverse selection (Lie 
2009). In situations of information asymmetry, it is possible for people to signal 
their type (i.e., education) and thus transfer this information to the other party and 
therefore resolving the asymmetry (Spence 1973). Furthermore, Keller and 
Lehman (2003) argue that a brand can serve as a signal by highlighting the 
different characteristics of the product or service and thereby decrease the 
perceived risk. Thus, it can help the customer to determine the quality of the 
product or service. This is further supported by Mishra, Heide and Cort (1998), 
suggesting that a brand name might serve as a signaling tool. However, branding 
and marketing efforts are not extensively used in the OHS market as a signaling 
mechanism (Meeting with NIOH, 23.6.2010). When emphasizing high quality, 
signaling efforts should only be undertaken when a company provides the 
customers with the actual promised quality (Kirmani and Rao 2000).  
 
The second problem related to information asymmetry is moral hazard. Moral 
hazard is characterized by hidden actions or hidden effort. In essence, it is difficult 
to observe the effort that parties puts into action (Husted 2007, 185). This is 
problematic as the seller can influence the level of quality provided for each 
transaction (Mishra, Heide, and Cort 1998). Holmstrom (1979, 74) proposes the 
following:  
 
It has long been recognized that a problem of moral hazard may arise when 
individuals engage in risk sharing under conditions such that their privately taken 
actions affect the probability distribution of the outcome. 
  
The problem of moral hazard appears since the seller has the ability and 
motivation to cheat by providing low quality instead of the agreed high quality. 
Unfortunately, low quality can be difficult to discover (Mishra, Heide, and Cort 
1998). As Husted (2007) argues, moral hazard occurs after a contract is signed. In 
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the OHS market contracts often last several and quality is difficult to evaluate 
years (Meeting with NIOH, 27.4.2011). An example is that if a company spends a 
given amount on OHS services in order to improve the well-being of employees, 
it is close to impossible to measure the output or end result of a given input. It 
should be noted that when the contract signing occurs, the information is complete 
and symmetric, as no action on how to behave afterwards is taken into 
consideration. However, as the intention between buyer and seller are unknown 
after contract signing, moral hazard is characterized as complete, but with 
asymmetric information (Husted 2007). The main difference between adverse 
selection and moral hazard is that adverse selection occurs before the contract is 
agreed upon, while moral hazard with hidden information occurs after the contract 
is agreed (Husted 2007, 185).  
 
To overcome the problem with moral hazard, one can use incentives, which 
prevent subsequent quality cheating (Mishra, Heide, and Cort 1998). Kreps  
(1990, 577) argues that the quality problem may be solved if the customer 
provides the seller with incentives to deliver the undertaken quality. Mishra, 
Heide and Cort (1998) suggest that incentives, like price premiums, may prevent 
moral hazard, as buyers are willing to pay a price premium in order to reduce the 
seller’s ability and motivation to cheat.  
 
2.2 Transaction Cost Theory  
Transaction cost theory builds upon the fundamental contribution of Williamson 
(1975; 1981). Performance ambiguity is a principal source of transaction costs 
(Bowen and Jones 1986). The central question within transaction cost theory is 
whether a transaction is more efficiently performed within a company (make) or 
outside the company by other providers (buy) (Geyskens, Steenkamp, and Kumar 
2006). Hence, transaction cost theory revolves around the choice of the company 
(make) or the market (buy). The OHS market consists of companies selecting 
either make or buy strategies. In transaction cost theory the focus is on the 
analysis of exchange and the central claim is that transaction will be handled in 
such a way as to minimize the cost involved in carrying out the transaction (David 
and Han 2004). The greater the performance ambiguity the higher the associated 
transaction cost in a given transaction (Bowen and Jones 1986). An indication in 
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the OHS market is that smaller companies buy their services from external OHS 
units, and thereby pursue a buy strategy. Larger companies are more prone to 
selecting a make strategy, thus having their own internal OHS unit within the 
company (Meeting with NIOH, 23.6.2010). The assumption within transaction 
cost theory is that a buy strategy is more efficient than a make strategy due to the 
benefits of competition. When a “market failure” occurs, a make strategy is 
assumed to be more efficient (Geyskens, Steenkamp, and Kumar 2006). 
Furthermore, channel members are assumed to be limited by bounded rationality 
and behave opportunistically (Klein 1989). These theories are connected with 
performance ambiguity, in the sense that opportunistic actors might contribute to 
increase ambiguity in the OHS market. This is because actors have limited 
information regarding transactions (Klein 1989).   
 
According to transaction cost theory, there are three key dimensions that 
contribute to increasing transaction cost and combined create “market failure” 
(Geyskens, Steenkamp, and Kumar 2006). These dimensions are asset specificity, 
uncertainty and transaction frequency (Williamson 1975). Transaction-specific 
assets are ones that are tailored to a particular transaction, and cannot be easily 
used outside the relationships of the parties of the transaction (Geyskens, 
Steenkamp, and Kumar 2006).  If the specificity is irrelevant, the asset specificity 
is zero. The second dimension, uncertainty, refers to when there is 
unpredictability ex ante of the transaction. If uncertainty is present the 
performance cannot be evaluated ahead of the transaction. Such uncertainty is 
present in the OHS market, as the services both have credence qualities and is 
highly intangible. Skaggs and Snow (2004) argue that intangible services create 
more uncertainty. The last dimension, transaction frequency, refers to the extent to 
which transactions recur (Geyskens, Steenkamp, and Kumar 2006). A make 
strategy may be the preferred choice if the transaction has a high level of 
recurrence (Rindfleisch and Heide 1997). It is hard to establish how frequent 
transactions occur in the OHS market, as contracts are ongoing and complex. In 
addition, the OHS services purchased by companies varies considerably (Lie 
2009).  
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Chapter 3 Hypotheses and Research Model 
This chapter begins with an explanation of the role of internal and external OHS. 
We then present the dependent variable, price premium, before examining the 
independent variables respectively. Each of the independent variables has related 
hypotheses. Lastly, we propose the research model.  
 
3.1 The role of internal and external OHS units 
There are differences between internal and external OHS units. Internal OHS units 
do not serve companies other than their owner. This is more common for large 
enterprises such as Aker. External OHS units are characterized as units serving 
several companies at the same time. Aleris AS is an example of an external unit. 
We want to investigate if price premium, performance ambiguity and branding 
investments influence internal and external OHS units differently.  
 
3.2 Price Premium  
We examine factors contributing to suppliers’ ability to charge price premiums in 
the OHS market. Aligned with this frame of mind we base our study on the 
dependent variable price premium. Rao and Monroe (1996, 512) define price 
premium as: “the difference between the super-high price and the perfectly 
competitive price for high-quality output”. In essence, focus on quality will 
increase revenue and lead to higher profits (Babakus, Beinstock, and Van Scotter 
2004). Furthermore, Klein and Leffler (1981) argue that the high prices accrue to 
sellers in the form of above-average profits. Price premiums differ from premium 
prices. Premium prices are considerably above average, reflecting the higher cost 
of producing high quality, but may not necessarily provide profits to sellers (Rao 
and Bergen 1992).  
 
A main rationale for price premiums is information asymmetry (Rao and Bergen 
1992). Information asymmetry stems upon the notion that not all buyers possess 
all information about the quality of the services provided (Akerlof 1970). This 
implies that the supplier has more information about the object of an exchange 
compared with the buyer (Mishra, Heide, and Cort 1998, 277). Because of the 
new law regulations in the OHS market, more companies must select an OHS unit 
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(Lie 2009). As companies with no previous experience in the OHS market are 
forced to select an OHS unit, information asymmetry can occur in the selected 
market. Such information asymmetry can result in opportunistic behavior (Klein 
1989). When such situations arise, two problems exist: adverse selection and 
moral hazard. In terms of adverse selection, suppliers do not possess the skills 
required to provide certain quality levels (Mishra, Heide, and Cort 1998). There 
might be instances where OHS customers cannot identify whether an OHS unit 
provides sufficient quality or not. Moral hazard occurs when suppliers easily 
influence the level of quality provided for each transaction (Mishra, Heide, and 
Cort 1998). In addition, moral hazard arises because suppliers have the ability and 
motivation to reduce the quality. The motivation for an OHS unit to cheat occurs 
because companies searching for an OHS unit do not necessarily have sufficient 
information. Therefore, companies might be willing to pay a price premium to 
reduce the risk of cheating.  
 
The theory of information economics is linked with information asymmetry 
theory. Nelson (1970) developed a framework for how difficult it is to evaluate 
services based on their properties. He classifies search services as types where 
quality can be determined prior to purchase. Therefore, customers do not need to 
use much effort on evaluating the service. In experience services, quality can only 
be determined after purchase and usage (Darby and Karni 1973). Darby and Karni 
(1973) added a third category to Nelson’s framework, credence services. It refers 
to services where quality is not necessarily possible to evaluate even after 
purchase and consumption. This is due to the high level of knowledge required to 
understand what the service does. Since OHS units offer services that are hard to 
evaluate and are intangible, they are classified as credence services. Because of 
this, there is an incentive for OHS units to cheat by offering unnecessary services 
for an extra fee. In addition, it can be hard for companies to define what to expect 
from the services with credence properties, as they might lack the expertise of 
identifying their own needs and demands (Galetzka, Verhoeven, and Pruyn 2006). 
This might be a problem for buyers in the market for OHS services. In credence 
setting, the customers tend to focus less on price, since they do not know how to 
compare prices with alternatives (Monroe 2003, 66). A similar view is proposed 
by Hsieh, Chiu and Chiang (2005), who postulate that credence services are often 
specialized for each customer. This makes comparison based on price more 
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difficult. Lie (2009) finds that the number of OHS services purchased by 
companies varies considerably, supporting the notion that services are specialized 
in the OHS market.   
 
3.3 Independent variables with hypotheses 
3.3.1 Performance Ambiguity and Price Premium 
Performance ambiguity relates to what degree buyers can judge service quality 
prior to purchase and during use. Specifically, revealing a supplier’s true level of 
performance (Stump and Heide 1996). It stems from the inability to measure 
performance of parties to an exchange, or inability even if performance can be 
measured, to accurately value it (Bowen and Jones 1986, 431). As the OHS 
market is characterized by services that are difficult to evaluate, with credence 
qualities, it is reasonable to believe that there exists performance ambiguity in the 
market. This corresponds with Bowen and Jones (1986), who argue that the 
dominating factor of performance ambiguity for services in particular, is the 
presence of intangibility. The more intangible the service is, the greater the 
performance ambiguity, as less evidence is available to assess the level of 
performance. Because buyers consider services from external OHS in the open 
market, with many actors, it is reasonable to believe that performance ambiguity 
is more present in this context than for internal OHS units.  
 
Zeithaml (1988) argues that consumers are risk averse. In order to overcome risk, 
they tend to select higher-priced alternatives to reduce the uncertainty, and 
thereby avoid the wrong alternative. This risk aversion is more likely to occur in 
an open market where buyers of external OHS services must evaluate the different 
levels of price offered by competing OHS units. As the company owns internal 
OHS units themselves, the level of performance ambiguity may be reduced, due to 
less perceived risk. Therefore, price premiums are not evaluated to the same 
extent as for buyers of external OHS units. Snow (2010) denotes the fact that risk 
averters willingly pay a price premium to reduce ambiguity. Following the 
preceding argument, risk is likely to be higher in the external OHS market, as 
information is more ambiguous. Hence, paying price premiums to reduce 
ambiguity is more likely to play an important role in the external OHS market. 
Therefore, we propose the following:  
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H1a: External OHS units experience a positive impact from performance 
ambiguity on price premium. 
 
H1b: Internal OHS units do not experience a positive impact from performance 
ambiguity on price premium. 
 
3.3.2 Quality and Performance Ambiguity 
According to Zeithaml (1988, 3) quality is defined as: “superiority or excellence”. 
A more general definition is proposed by the American Society for Quality 
(2010), which defines quality as: “the characteristics of a product or service that 
bear on its ability to satisfy stated or implied needs”. In other words, quality is an 
essential aspect for customers making a choice. Quality is therefore also important 
for units to stay competitive, sustain over time and differentiate themselves from 
competition.  
 
In the OHS market, quality is of vital importance. Particularly after the new law 
regulations, enabling OHS companies to compete against each other in an open 
market (Norwegian Labour Inspection Authority 2010). As a result, quality might 
be an important factor for companies deciding on their choice of an OHS unit. 
Since a typical OHS unit consists of several positions such as nurses, ergonomists 
and physicians, quality evaluation can vary depending on the interactions in the 
treatment process (Lie 2009). Therefore, it might be difficult to evaluate the 
overall quality of an OHS unit. In addition, quality in respect of OHS may be hard 
to evaluate after treatment because it is a credence service (Darby and Karni 
1973). Ostrom and Iacobucci (1995) argue that because the quality of credence 
services is difficult to judge, a low price may be a cue for poor quality. It is 
therefore evident that evaluation of quality from the buyer’s perspective is 
important both when dealing with internal and external OHS units. As previously 
mentioned, a higher level of performance ambiguity is more likely to occur in the 
market for external OHS units. As such, evaluating quality can be harder for 
buyers looking for external OHS units compared with internal OHS units.  
 
Moreover, perceived quality is also a major factor with regards to choosing OHS 
units, because service quality is formed by prior experiences. Hence, it refers to 
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the customer’s judgment of the superiority or excellence. Keller (2003, 238) 
defines perceived service quality as: “the customers perception of the overall 
quality or advantage of a service relative to relevant alternatives and with respect 
to its intended purpose”. For internal OHS units the level of quality will have a 
limited effect on reducing performance ambiguity, as they are owned by the 
company that is responsible for the evaluation. As such, the incentives for 
evaluating and comparing the level of quality are absent, compared with buyers 
evaluating the level of quality for external OHS units. For buyers looking for 
external OHS units, quality is more likely to reduce performance ambiguity, as 
long as quality can be evaluated to some extent. For instance, a buyer in the 
market for an external OHS unit might be able to evaluate and compare some 
characteristics of OHS offerings, despite the fact that there is a limited amount of 
information for buyers. Quality might therefore be used as a signaling strategy for 
external OHS units, in order to overcome problems with performance ambiguity 
(Spence 2002). As Kirmani and Rao (2000) argue, signaling quality can 
distinguish low-quality providers from high-quality providers. Such signaling 
could reduce performance ambiguity for buyers in the market for external OHS 
units. Therefore, we propose the following: 
 
H2a: External OHS units experience a positive impact from quality on 
performance ambiguity. 
 
H2b: Internal OHS units do not experience a positive impact from quality on 
performance ambiguity. 
 
3.3.3 Reputation and Performance Ambiguity 
Shapiro (1983) postulates that reputation only makes sense in an imperfect 
information world. Imperfect information is present in the OHS market. As a 
consequence, reputation might be one way for buyers to overcome the problem of 
performance ambiguity in the OHS market (Herbig and Milewicz 1993). Herbig 
and Milewicz (1993, 18) define reputation as: “the estimation of the consistency 
over time of an attribute of an entity”. They further argue that reputation is 
established by the flow of information from one user to another. Such a flow of 
information is more likely to occur in the external OHS market. A transaction 
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between two parties must have occurred in order for a reputation to be established 
(Herbig and Milewicz 1993). Internal OHS units may not consider a transaction 
between itself and its owner as a transaction between two parties. Therefore, 
reputation might be less important for internal OHS units compared with external 
OHS units where transactions actually consist of two separate parties. As external 
OHS units compete in the open market (Lie 2009), using reputation as a signaling 
tool to reduce performance ambiguity becomes more essential. This is because 
potential buyers might use reputation as a tool to evaluate external OHS units.  
 
In addition, reputation occurs primarily through signaling (Herbig and Milewicz 
1993), meaning: “actions that the parties take to reveal their true types”(Kirmani 
and Rao 2000, 66). In essence, signaling helps identify procedures unknown to the 
buyers because the motives of a potential seller can be unknown or hidden. In the 
OHS market, this can be problematic when the buyer does not have sufficient 
information about OHS units. Hence, signaling might increase reputation and 
prevent opportunistic behavior, since its purpose is to reduce performance 
ambiguity. In line with our previous argument, signaling a reputation is more 
relevant for external OHS units. Therefore, we propose the following: 
 
H3a: External OHS units experience a positive impact from reputation on 
performance ambiguity. 
 
H3b: Internal OHS units do not experience a positive impact from reputation on 
performance ambiguity. 
 
3.3.4 Punishment and Performance Ambiguity 
Punishment follows the notion that OHS units can have an incentive to cheat, by 
providing poor quality. This can occur if the buyers do not have the opportunity or 
ability to punish the seller. If sellers can cheat the customer, they are likely to earn 
above-average profits by charging a price premium. The ultimate punishment an 
OHS unit can receive is that the buyer stops purchasing their services. Obviously, 
if buyers punish the seller, they will lose all future profits (Rao and Bergen 1992). 
Recent trends in the OHS market show that buyers change their OHS units more 
frequently (Meeting with NIOH, 23.6.2010). This could be due to such cheating.  
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It is more likely that external OHS units expose themselves to punishment from 
their buyers. This is because internal OHS units are less likely to cheat their 
owners than external OHS units. In addition, control mechanisms attempting to 
detect cheating might be more common in the market for external OHS units, thus 
making punishment more frequent.  
 
Because we deal with a credence service, evaluating cheating is a problem. As 
such, punishment might be an important variable in the OHS market. Given that 
the buyer cannot punish the seller, there is a clear incentive of obtaining a price 
premium in the marketplace. Rao and Bergen (1992) argue that buyers reward 
honest sellers with price premiums and punish dishonest sellers by denying them 
future sales. Therefore, we propose the following: 
 
H4a: External OHS units experience a negative impact from punishment on 
performance ambiguity. 
 
H4b: Internal OHS units do not experience a negative impact from punishment on 
performance ambiguity. 
 
3.3.5 Brand Investments and Brand Credibility  
When other factors such as reputation and quality are lacking or hard to evaluate, 
branding can serve as a promise to the customer (Erdem and Swait 1998). This is 
based upon the notion that the brand will convey and confirm the seller as the 
responsible body in a given transaction. The American Marketing Association 
define brand as a: “name, term, design, symbol, or any other feature that identifies 
one seller's good or service as distinct from those of other sellers” (American 
Marketing Association 2010). In the OHS market, brands might serve as an 
important information cue contributing to separating between competing OHS 
units. Arguably, this will be more important for external OHS units competing in 
the open market, compared with internal OHS units. Since internal OHS units are 
owned by the parent company, they are not likely to use resources to brand their 
services.  
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Brand investments can lead to brand credibility (Erdem and Swait 1998). Erdem 
and Swait (2004, 192) define brand credibility as: “the believability of the product 
information contained in a brand, which requires that consumers perceive that the 
brand have the ability (i.e., expertise) and willingness (i.e., trustworthiness) to 
continuously deliver what has been promised”. Erdem and Swait (1998) argue that 
brand credibility is one of the most important choice criteria for buyers. 
Furthermore, they postulate that when a market is characterized by imperfect and 
asymmetric information, it is important for a company to convey credible 
information to consumers (Erdem and Swait 1998). Hence, the information about 
a brand’s position signaled to consumers by a company should be perceived as 
truthful and dependable. Buyers looking for external OHS units must deal with 
asymmetric information in a given transaction to a greater extent than “buyers” of 
internal OHS services. Therefore brand credibility might be an important choice 
criterion for external OHS units.  
 
Increasing brand investments are likely to increase brand credibility (Erdem and 
Swait 1998), and as such make it easier for customers to choose between OHS 
units. This is particularly important for external OHS units that compete more 
directly with competitors, than internal OHS units. Therefore, we propose the 
following: 
 
H5a: External OHS units experience a positive impact from brand investments on 
brand credibility. 
 
H5b: Internal OHS units do not experience a positive impact from brand 
investments on brand credibility. 
 
3.3.6 Brand Credibility and Price Premium 
In the OHS market, the tendencies of merging companies can effectively create 
larger organizations (Lie 2009). This might contribute to larger and more credible 
brands. The rationale is that credible brands will be more trustworthy, thus 
reducing perceived risk and simplify decisions for consumers (Erdem and Swait 
1998). Credible brands can reduce risk, and some buyers are willing to pay a price 
premium to reduce uncertainty (Snow 2010). Price premiums are more likely to 
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occur for buyers looking for external OHS units, because brand credibility might 
be more valuable in the competitive market where there is more uncertainty.  
 
In addition, it is likely that companies will use more money on building brand 
credibility, to stand out in a more competitive market. OHS units with a credible 
brand have less incentive to cheat the customer as it would effectively damage 
brand equity, reputation, and ultimately put future profits at risk (Rao and Monroe 
1996). The more the company has spent on making the brand credible, the more 
risk the company faces by cheating the buyer. Evidently, a credible brand reduces 
the risk for the buyers and makes selection easier (Keller 2008, 7), which could 
lead to price premiums. Arguably, internal OHS units might focus less on building 
brand credibility, and thus are not able to obtain price premiums that easily. The 
effect of investing in brand credibility should be that companies gain a price 
premium (Erdem, Swait, and Louviere 2002). The notion follows that enhancing 
the brand informs consumers about the presence of price premiums and 
consequently be accepted by the purchaser (Klein and Leffler 1981). Therefore, 
we propose the following: 
 
H5c: External OHS units experience a positive impact from brand credibility on 
price premium. 
 
H5d: Internal OHS units do not experience a positive impact from brand 
credibility on price premium. 
 
3.3.7 Switching Costs and Performance Ambiguity 
Heide and Weiss (1995) argue that buyers switching costs stems from earlier 
commitments to a particular technology or commitments to a specific seller. In the 
OHS market, switching costs is likely to be more related to commitments to 
specific sellers rather than technology. Switching costs can be related to 
transaction cost theory, in the sense that the goal is to minimize the cost involved 
in carrying out transactions (David and Han 2004). All else being equal, buyers 
will be motivated to stay in existing relationships to economize on switching 
costs. Often this is because the expected benefits of choosing a new seller are 
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negligible compared with the potential switching costs involved (Heide and Weiss 
1995). 
 
In the OHS market, the more one perceives switching costs, the more likely one is 
to stay with its current OHS unit. Buyers currently having an external OHS unit 
might have fewer barriers to switch OHS unit as they are part of a competitive 
market. Internal OHS units are less likely to be replaced, as they are owned by 
their parent company. In transaction cost theory, an important rationale is that 
performance ambiguity is a key determinant of maintaining long-term 
relationships with sellers (Williamson 1975; Bowen and Jones 1986). When 
performance ambiguity exists in the market, buyers tend to favor the commitment 
of a long-term relationship to decrease switching costs. This occurs because 
negotiating, monitoring and evaluating quality will be greater when performance 
ambiguity is present (Bendapudi and Berry 1997). Bowen and Jones (1986) 
postulate that when there is a high level of performance ambiguity, buyers will 
rely on a single relationships as it results in lower switching costs.  
 
Since OHS units deliver services to their buyers, it involves a high level of 
performance ambiguity due to its credence properties (Darby and Karni 1973) and 
its intangibility (Shostack 1987). Investing in a specific relationship increases 
customer dependency as it raises the cost of switching to competitors. By 
switching to a competitor, the buyer is likely to lose the established benefits, 
which take time to build with a new seller (Bendapudi and Berry 1997). However, 
the OHS services might not be that relationship specific, and as such switching 
costs may not be perceived as high in the marketplace. This is especially for 
buyers of external OHS services, as they are less likely to invest as many 
resources in a relationship. In contrast, owners of internal OHS units are likely to 
be highly committed to their parent company, contributing to higher switching 
costs. Internal OHS units are likely to be more dependent on their owner than 
external OHS units. Not only can it take more time for the owner of an internal 
OHS unit to effectively deal with a new supplier, but it would also involve 
discontinuation of OHS activities within the company. Therefore, we propose the 
following: 
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H6a: External OHS units experience a positive impact from switching costs on 
performance ambiguity. 
 
H6b: Internal OHS units do not experience a positive impact from switching costs 
on performance ambiguity. 
 
3.3.8 Environmental Uncertainty and Performance Ambiguity 
Uncertainty is used in a variety of ways (Downey and Slocum 1975). Within 
organization theory literature, uncertainty is a central concept where one seek to 
explain the nature of the relationship between organizations and their 
environments (Milliken 1987). There exist several definitions of environmental 
uncertainty. We follow the definition presented by Milliken (1987, 134) that 
environmental uncertainty is: “an inability to predict accurately what the 
outcomes of a decision might be”. Duncan (1972) argued that environmental 
uncertainty involves not knowing the outcome of a decision in relation to how 
much an organization would lose if the decision were incorrect. A rationale within 
environmental uncertainty, is that the source of uncertainty stems from the 
organizations external environment (Milliken 1987). In other words, there are 
factors in the environment of the organization that are unpredictable. Furthermore, 
environmental uncertainty relates to performance ambiguity in the sense that it 
involves not understanding how the environment is changing. Performance 
ambiguity refers to problems of evaluating true level of performance, due to 
something vague or unsure in connection with missing information (Stump and 
Heide 1996; Bowen and Jones 1986; Ellsberg 1961). This is aligned with 
environmental uncertainty, involving the inability to predict accurately because of 
insufficient information (Gifford, Bobbitt, and Slocum 1979). Evidently, a higher 
level of environmental uncertainty leads to greater performance ambiguity. The 
more volatile, complex and heterogeneous a market is the more environmental 
uncertainty (Milliken 1987). In others words, unstable markets are subject to more 
environmental uncertainty than stable markets. 
 
It is likely that there is more environmental uncertainty for buyers looking for 
external OHS units, as the market can be more unstable than for owners of 
internal OHS units. Milliken (1987) postulates that organizations that are 
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uncertain about their environment will devote a greater amount of resources to 
understand the mechanisms operating in the market, compared with organizations 
that believe they understand their environment. This can be related to transaction 
cost theory, in the sense that organizations uncertain about their environment will 
increase their transaction costs. It is due to the cost of monitoring and 
comprehending the market, in an effort to reduce environmental uncertainty and 
performance ambiguity. Buyers in the market for external OHS units are likely to 
put more resources in comprehending the market in order to stay competitive and 
reduce environmental uncertainty. Arguably, internal OHS units might not have 
the same incentives to monitor the market, as they are owned by their parent 
company and are less likely to put effort into dealing with competition. Therefore, 
we propose the following:  
 
H7a: External OHS units experience a positive impact from environmental 
uncertainty on performance ambiguity. 
 
H7b: Internal OHS units do not experience a positive impact from environmental 
uncertainty on performance ambiguity. 
 
3.3.9 Information Costs Saved and Performance Ambiguity 
In a competitive market, understanding how organizations perform information 
search activities can be important in order to succeed. If performance ambiguity is 
present in the market, the amount of search effort is extended contributing to 
increasing information costs (Bunn, Butaney, and Hoffman 2001). The logic is 
that buyers incur costs when gathering and processing information to reduce 
uncertainty and perceived risk (Shugan 1980). Furthermore, Hutton (1997) argues 
that organizational buying behavior can be characterized as almost entirely a 
function of risk. However, different signaling strategies can help to lower 
information costs, and thereby reduce the degree of performance ambiguity 
(Erdem and Swait 1998). Mitchell (1995) states that buying from well-known 
companies may be one way to reduce risk and thereby lower information costs. 
Furthermore, signaling the clarity of a brand can also reduce performance 
ambiguity, and therefore convey information effectively, contributing to reducing 
information costs (Erdem and Swait 1998).  
GRA 19002 Master Thesis  1.9.2011 
Page 25 
As performance ambiguity exists in the OHS market, a viable strategy for an OHS 
unit can be to convince buyers of what they can gain from the provided services. 
If an OHS unit provides customers with what they want, it is likely to reduce 
information costs, as buyers do not have to spend resources on finding OHS 
alternatives. Consequently, this might lead to reduced performance ambiguity for 
buyers. The level of perceived risk and information costs accrued depends on the 
informational structure of the market (Erdem and Swait 1998). As external OHS 
units compete more fiercely than internal OHS units, it might be more important 
to convey credible information. This is because the informational structure of the 
external OHS market is likely to be more complex than for internal OHS units. 
Conveying such information to potential buyers can reduce their information costs 
and thus performance ambiguity. Therefore, we propose the following: 
 
H8a: External OHS units experience a positive impact from information costs 
saved on performance ambiguity. 
 
H8b: Internal OHS units do not experience a positive impact from information 
costs saved on performance ambiguity. 
 
3.3.10 Market Turbulence and Performance Ambiguity 
Market turbulence has been conceptualized in different ways by different authors 
(Santos-Vijande and Álvarez-González 2007). Kohli and Jaworski (1990, 14) 
define it as: “changes in the composition of customers and their preferences”. 
Slater and Narver (1994) follow this definition, however they point out that 
market turbulence is a subset of the environmental turbulence construct. 
Furthermore, market turbulence is similar to the concept heterogeneity, which 
Miller (1987, 62) defines as: “differences in the marketing and production 
requirements of different market segments”. Greenley (1995) supports Miller, 
emphasizing the extent to which marketing operations change as a consequence of 
new customer needs. Hult, Hurley and Knight (2004) sum up the construct nicely. 
They argue that market turbulence reflects rapidly changing buyer preferences, 
wide-ranging needs and wants, ongoing buyer entry and exit from the market 
place and constant emphasis on offering new products. All the authors agree that 
market turbulence concerns change in the market; however the elements of change 
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they focus on differs. Market turbulence can also encompass change of the 
companies’ competitors and the market uncertainty (Santos-Vijande and Álvarez-
González 2007). In that manner, companies evaluate the change of competitors in 
order to cope with new competitive scenarios.  
 
Within the OHS market, several changes have occurred recently. Many OHS 
professionals are worried about the future of OHS in Norway, due to major 
structural changes (Lie 2009). Buyers of services from external OHS units are 
likely to face more market turbulence than owners of internal OHS units. Because 
competition in the external OHS market can be fiercer, it might be harder to 
evaluate the services offered. As a result, competition can increase performance 
ambiguity, both for buyers and for external OHS units trying to stay competitive 
in the market. Organizations that operate in a more turbulent market, might be 
more required to modify their services constantly, to cater to changing customer 
needs (Jaworski and Kohli 1993). Chakravarthy (1997) postulates that when a 
market is complex and rapidly changing, the resulting turbulence makes 
responding to competition more difficult. As external OHS units often cater to 
many customers, they are required to serve more complex and diverging customer 
needs than internal OHS units. Therefore, we propose the following: 
 
H9a: External OHS units experience a positive impact from market turbulence on 
performance ambiguity. 
 
H9b: Internal OHS units do not experience a positive impact from market 
turbulence on performance ambiguity. 
 
3.4 Research Model 
Based on our literature review, we propose the following research model 
consisting of price premium as the dependent variable and performance 
ambiguity, quality, reputation, punishment, brand investments, brand credibility, 
switching costs, environmental uncertainty, information costs saved and market 
turbulence as independent variables (Figure 1). We want to capture which factors 
allow suppliers to receive price premiums in the market. In addition, we separate 
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between internal and external OHS units to investigate if the factors influence the 
types of OHS units differently.   
 
Figure 1: Conceptual model 
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Chapter 4 Research Methodology 
In the following chapter we describe the research method used in the study. We 
discuss research design, key informants, data collection method, sampling, 
measures and lastly the pretest. 
 
4.1 Research design 
A research design is the heart and soul of a marketing research project. It outlines 
how the marketing research project is done and guides data collection, analysis 
and report preparation (Malhotra 2010, 100). According to Ghauri and Grønhaug 
(2002), the choice of a research design serves as an overall strategy with the 
purpose to answer the research problem in the best possible manner. Malhotra 
(2010, 102-103) states that a research design may be classified as either 
exploratory or conclusive. The objective of an exploratory study is to provide 
insights and understanding of a phenomenon, whereas for a conclusive study, the 
objective is to test specific hypotheses and examine relationships. As we 
investigate causes of price premiums, the study is characterized as a descriptive 
research. The objective of a descriptive research is to describe something, often 
market characteristics (Malhotra 2010, 106).  
 
4.2 Key Informants 
The unit of analysis in our study is the organizations in the Norwegian OHS 
market. Since measuring an organization is complex and difficult, one should 
ideally rely on key informants for obtaining information. Campbell (1955) argues 
that the key informant should be a member of the company who has such a role 
that he or she is well-informed about the research topic. Even though it would be 
beneficial to specifically ask for key informants in our study, we decided not to, 
fearing a low response rate. However, NIOH explained that it is not common to 
specifically ask for key respondents when performing surveys in this market 
(Meeting with NIOH, 27.4.2011).  
 
4.3 Data collection method 
We used an internet survey as the data collection method. One inherent 
disadvantage of using an internet survey is the risk of expired and incorrect e-mail 
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addresses. This is a profound problem as people and companies change e-mail 
addresses frequently. Another risk is that companies receive a large number of 
invitations to surveys. Therefore, it might be hard to be chosen by the respondent. 
Furthermore, the risk of obtaining answers from unintended persons is also 
present, as companies often use generic e-mails. A low barrier for not responding 
is another problem with internet surveys, at least if the survey becomes too long.    
 
One of the major advantages of using an internet survey is the low economic cost. 
Another advantage is its easy distribution across a vast geographical distance. 
Furthermore, internet surveys are much faster to conduct than telephone surveys 
(Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias 2008, 225). The time span from distributing 
the data and collection is often short, which leads to an efficient data collection 
process. Also, sending reminders to the panel increases the possibility of getting 
as many respondents as possible. An internet survey also let the respondents 
choose when to answer. As such, it is more convenient compared with telephone 
interviews, where reaching respondents at an appropriate time is difficult. Lastly, 
we have free access to the internet survey provider QuestBack, which facilitates 
design and distribution of the survey to the respondents. 
  
4.4 Sampling 
Our sample is generated from two sources. The first source was from an OHS 
registry acquired from NIOH. Their list consists of e-mail addresses ranging from 
private e-mail addresses to company e-mail addresses. We combined the OHS 
registry with a registry provided by the Norwegian Labor Inspection Authority. 
These two registries combined provide us with more data and in the end a 
possibly higher response rate.  
 
4.5 Measures 
Because we use a questionnaire as a measurement tool for the study, we describe 
how we plan to measure each variable in the following section. We based the 
questionnaire on previous studies conducted by researchers. We tried to make the 
wordings in the statements as similar to the statements in the research articles, 
since those statements already have been used successfully. Logically, this 
reduced the chances of errors such as leading or biased question, because the 
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authors already have taken such problems into consideration (Malhotra 2010, 
348). However, we modified some of the statements slightly in order to fit our 
setting more appropriately. We did this in order to make the statements reflect our 
constructs in the best possible manner. Operationalization of the variables can be 
found in Appendix 1.  
 
We use a seven-point Likert scale in our questionnaire. The scale ranges from one 
to seven, where one (1) is equal to strongly disagree and seven (7) is equal to 
strongly agree. When applying such a scale respondents are required to indicate 
their degree of agreement or disagreement (Malhotra 2010, 338). We applied the 
Likert scale because of its advantages. It is easy to develop and administer, and it 
is simple for respondents to comprehend how to use the scale. Lastly, Likert 
scales are suitable for electronic questionnaires (Malhotra 2010, 309). 
 
4.5.1 Dependent variable 
According to Malhotra (2010, 253), dependent variables are the variables that 
measure the effect of the independent variable on the test unit. From the research 
model, the dependent variable used in this study is price premium (Figure 1). In 
this study, price premium is referred to as: “the difference between a super-high 
price and the perfectly competitive price for high-quality output” (Rao and 
Monroe 1996, 512). We measure the dependent variable using scales developed 
by Rao and Bergen (1992) and Mishra, Heide and Cort (1998) as guidelines. We 
propose the following four items: 
 
 Our customers are willing to pay us a higher price than normal for similar 
OHS services. 
 The typical price that we charge for our OHS services is considerably 
higher than what our competitors charge for the same service. 
 We are in the highest price level for our OHS services compared with the 
market in general. 
 Our company claims a price whose magnitude or size is higher than 
normal for this kind of OHS services. 
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4.5.2 Independent variables 
Independent variables are variables or alternatives that are manipulated (i.e., the 
levels of these variables are changed by the researcher) and whose effects are 
measured and compared (Malhotra 2010, 253). From the research model, we use 
the following independent variables: performance ambiguity quality, reputation, 
punishment, brand investments, brand credibility, switching costs, environmental 
uncertainty, information costs saved and market turbulence (Figure 1). 
 
Performance ambiguity is defined as: “the difficulties faced by the customers in 
evaluating a service offering”  (Mishra, Heide, and Cort 1998, 283). Mishra, 
Heide and Cort (1998) and Rao and Bergen (1992) serve as a basis for seven items 
related to performance ambiguity: 
 
 Customers have to assume that they are getting good service from us. 
 It would be very time consuming to check up on how well an employee is 
performing his job. 
 It is difficult for customers to evaluate the right amount of OHS service 
that we offer. 
 Our customers are not able to evaluate the quality until the services are 
delivered. 
 There are no sufficient standards for measuring OHS service quality prior 
to purchase. 
 Our customers have difficulties in defining the level of quality they need 
when buying from us. 
 For the type of OHS services our OHS provides, customers are only able 
to evaluate the quality after an extended period of usage. 
 
Quality describes the characteristics of a product or service that have a bearing on 
its ability to satisfy stated or implied needs (American Society for Quality 2010). 
We identify four items adopted from the scale of Rao and Bergen (1992): 
 
 Our company feels that high service quality is crucial for our customers. 
 Our customers would suffer a significant monetary loss if the quality of 
our services was low. 
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 Our customers check that the quality of the services they receive from us 
always are of a high level of quality. 
 The services provided by our company consist in general of a high level of 
quality. 
 
Reputation is defined as: “the estimation of the consistency over time of an 
attribute of an entity” (Herbig and Milewicz 1993, 18). We use three items 
adopted from the scale of Rao and Bergen (1992): 
 
 Our company has a superior reputation in the market place.  
 Our company has a reputation for delivering services with superior quality 
relative to other OHS units. 
 Our company is highly trustworthy. 
 
Punishment refers to buyers’ willingness to punish cheating by discontinuing 
business with the seller. We use two items in the questionnaire based on the scale 
from Rao and Bergen (1992): 
 
 Our company would suffer significant economic losses if our service 
quality is revealed to be low. 
 Our customers would blacklist and not do business with us again if we 
deliver low quality OHS services. 
 
Brand investments refer to the amount of money spent on marketing the company 
to the public. We use three items based on the scale by Erdem and Swait (1998): 
 
 Our company spends annually significant amounts of money on 
marketing. 
 Our company has invested considerable amounts of money on the 
community over the years. 
 Our company spends annually considerable amounts of money to be 
visible in the market place. 
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Brand credibility refers to the degree to which consumers believe in the promises 
made by the brand. We use three items based on Erdem and Swait (1998) in this 
study: 
 
 Our company delivers what it promises.  
 Our services are believable.  
 Our company has a brand our customers can trust.  
 
Switching costs stems from commitments to a technology or commitments to a 
specific seller (Heide and Weiss 1995). Heide and Weiss (1995) serve as a basis 
for two items related to switching costs: 
 
 Our belief was that developing procedures to deal effectively with a new 
OHS supplier would take a lot of time and effort. 
 We thought that developing working relationships with new OHS 
suppliers would be a time-consuming process.  
 
Environmental uncertainty refers to uncertainty in a company’s environment, and 
an inability to predict accurately the outcome of a decision. We use five items 
based on the scale by Jaworski and Kohli (1993) as a basis to measure 
environmental uncertainty: 
 
 It is very hard to predict the number of OHS units in the market.  
 The competition between the different OHS units in the local market we 
operate in is fierce. 
 There are many promotion wars in our market. 
 Price competition is a hallmark in our market. 
 Our competitors are relatively weak. 
 
Information costs saved regards costs involved in processing information in order 
to reduce uncertainty. Erdem and Swait (2004) provide us with three items that 
measure information costs saved:  
 
GRA 19002 Master Thesis  1.9.2011 
Page 34 
 Our customers know what they get from our OHS, which saves them time 
on finding other alternatives. 
 Our customers know that our OHS will be present in the future. 
 Our OHS provides our customers with what they want, which saves both 
time and energy on finding other alternatives. 
 
Market turbulence involves changes in the market such as buyer preferences and 
needs. We use four items based on the study by Jaworski and Kohli (1993) as a 
basis to measure market turbulence: 
 
 Our customers are price-sensitive. 
 We are witnessing demand from our services from customers who never 
bought them before. 
 We cater to many of the same customers that we used to in the past. 
 Our customers tend to look for new OHS services all the time.  
 
4.6 Pretest 
Before publishing our questionnaire, we asked representatives from NIOH to 
quality assure the questions. Based on their feedback we made some minor 
adjustments. After this we conducted a quantitative pretest in order to ensure that 
the operationalization of the variables was valid and understandable for the 
respondents. We also did this in order to check how much time respondents used. 
We applied the debriefing method suggested by Webb (2000). This implies that 
we presented the respondents in the pretest with a questionnaire as similar as 
possible to the one we were going to use in the main study. The pretest was done 
on a small sample of four OHS units selected from the OHS registry by NIOH. 
All of the OHS units answered the pretest. Their feedback indicated no need for 
serious changes. Only small modifications such as expected time usage were 
changed before finalizing the questionnaire.  
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Chapter 5 Data Analysis 
In the following chapter we present our analysis and interpretation of the data. We 
present the data collection process, an overview of the sample characteristics, 
before performing both an exploratory factor analysis and a confirmatory factor 
analysis.  
 
5.1 Data collection process 
We conducted our questionnaire through the online survey provider QuestBack. 
The questionnaire used in the study can be found in Appendix 2. The online 
survey provider is easy to use, suitable for collecting a large amount of data, has 
the possibility to export data to statistical programs. By using an online survey 
provider we avoid the risk of punching errors in the data collection.    
 
Respondents were presented with a letter of introduction before responding to the 
survey (Appendix 3). In the letter, the respondents were informed of an incentive 
for answering the survey, namely a free copy of the summarized results and 
findings of the study. To achieve a higher credibility of the sender, we received 
permission from both NIOH representatives and Ragnhild Silkoset to include their 
names in the invitation. Contact information to reach both of the authors was also 
included in the letter of introduction.  
 
The survey time frame was between 5.5.2011 and 19.5.2011. In total, 500 
invitations were sent out. In the period after we published the questionnaire and 
before a reminder was distributed on 11.5.2011, we obtained 95 responses 
accounting for 19 % of the total sample size. As the use of e-mail often gets low 
respondent rates, we decided to send a follow-up reminder to the respondents who 
had not answered the survey to get the highest possible response rate. After the 
reminder was sent out, and until the questionnaire was completed, we acquired an 
additional 62 responses. We included the respondents from the pretest, as we did 
not alter anything. In total, we ended up with 161 responses (Appendix 4). This 
computes to a total response rate of 32.2 %. 161 responses is acceptable, as it 
provides us with the opportunity to conduct statistical analyses in SPSS and 
LISREL (Tomassen 2004, 85).   
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5.2 Sample characteristics  
161 respondents from the OHS market make up our sample. 116 respondents 
represented external OHS units accounting for 72 % of the sample. The remaining 
28 % represented internal OHS units (Table 2). 
 
 
 
The distribution of the OHS units is relatively skewed. According to NIOH, this is 
an actual representation of the market characteristics, and therefore our sample is 
pertinent to the total OHS market (E-mail from NIOH, 21.5.2011).  
 
Most of the companies in the sample are private, with a total of 135 units 
accounting for 84 %. Public service companies denoted a total of 26, representing 
only 16 % of the total sample size. By performing a cross tabulation we revealed 
that external OHS units in large are private companies. Some 107 out of 116 are 
private companies (92.2 %). Within internal OHS units private companies also 
represent the largest amount, although not as much as for external OHS units. In 
total, 28 out of 45 are private companies (62.2 %) (Table 3).  
 
 
 
Furthermore, the average number of man-labor years within the companies is 
almost 13. The range of man-labor years is from 1 to 330. This indicates that we 
have a sample consisting of both small and large OHS units. Within the OHS 
units, nearly 50 % (N = 77) of the sample size consist of man-labor years of less 
than five. Man-labor years in the range between 6 and 10 cover 51 units (32 %). 
There are few cases of large corporations, as only 3 corporations have more than 
41 man-labor years, accounting for almost 2 % (Table 4).  
Table 2: Type of OHS unit
Frequency Percent
External OHS 116 72
Internal OHS 45 28
Total 161 100
Table 3: Type of companies
Frequency Percent
Public 26 16.1
Private 135 83.9
Total 161 100
Public Private Total
External OHS 9 107 116
Internal OHS 17 28 45
Total 26 135 161
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Finally, on average we explored that external OHS units provided their services to 
132 companies, whereas the largest one served 800 different companies. Also, we 
found that none of the internal OHS units provided services to any other than their 
parent company (Table 5). 
 
 
5.3 Factor analysis 
The purpose of factor analysis is to simplify complex relationships between 
observed variables, in order to make the connections more understandable 
(Gripsrud, Olsson, and Silkoset 2004, 324). Its primary usefulness is to take a 
large number of observable instances to measure an unobservable construct or 
constructs (George and Mallery 2009, 246).  
 
It is common to separate between exploratory factor analysis (EFA) and 
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) (Gripsrud, Olsson, and Silkoset 2004, 327).  
EFA is a general term for a class of multivariate analysis techniques whose goal is 
to decrease the size of a dataset, and to reduce it to an actual underlying 
dimension. The variables are reduced to a smaller amount of previously unknown 
dimensions, which are also referred to as factors (Janssens et al. 2008, 245). CFA, 
on the other hand is used to verify or test the factor structure of a set of observed 
Table 4: Man-labor years
External OHS Internal OHS Total
Man-labor years <5 Count 52 25 77
% of Total 32.3% 15.5% 47.8%
6-10 Count 38 13 51
% of Total 23.6% 8.1% 31.7%
11-20 Count 16 5 21
% of Total 9.9% 3.1% 13 %
21-40 Count 8 1 9
% of Total 5 % .6% 5.6%
>41 Count 2 1 3
% of Total 1.2% .6% 1.9%
Total Count 116 45 161
% of Total 72 % 28 % 100 %
OHS type
Table 5: Number of companies that OHS  provides services to
External OHS N Valid 114
Missing 2
Mean 132.36
Minimum 0
Maximum 800
Internal OHS N Valid 0
Missing 45
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variables. It allows us to test the hypothesis that a relationship between our 
observed variables and their underlying latent construct exist (Suhr 2001).  
 
In our thesis we apply both EFA and CFA. The reason for performing both 
methods is to get a better insight of our data. Using both methods gives us a more 
reliable indication of which factors and items that is subject for removal or 
alteration. The goal of performing both methods is to facilitate easy data 
interpretation and analysis. EFA is conducted in order to investigate if there are 
any patterns or interesting connections without adapting the data by not imposing 
a preconceived structure. We want to check if items load on multiple factors. If 
this is the case, the factors might be excluded from further analysis. In addition, 
we conduct CFA in order to modify and impose a given structure among the 
variables based on the theory from the literature review.   
 
5.3.1 Requirements before performing EFA and CFA  
Before conducting EFA and CFA there are some preconditions that must be 
fulfilled. We assess normality, correlation check and sample size.  
 
5.3.1.1 Assessing normality  
Essentially, the data needs to follow a normal distribution in order for most 
analyses to work properly. If the variation from the normal distribution is 
sufficiently large, all resulting statistical tests are invalid, because normality is 
required to run different statistical test (Hair et al. 2010, 71). There are two 
aspects to normality of a distribution, skewness and kurtosis, and both must be 
tested before normality can be established. Skewness is used to describe the 
balance of the distribution, while kurtosis is the peakedness or flatness of the 
distribution compared with the normal distribution (Hair et al. 2010, 71). As a rule 
of thumb, both skewness and kurtosis should be between -2 and +2 (George and 
Mallery 2011, 99). It should be noted that all the variables are on a Likert scale, 
and therefore do not possess the real qualities of normal distribution. However, 
this is not considered as an immediate problem in the further analysis.  
In our sample there are tendencies of violating both skewness and kurtosis.  
In Table 6, we present the items with skewness or kurtosis values higher than the 
critical value. In terms of skewness, only item Markturb_3 violate the rule of 
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thumb. Kurtosis seems to be a problem with our dataset, as several items have 
kurtosis values above the critical limit. 
 
 
 
To further check for normality problems, we investigate skewness and kurtosis 
values on an overall construct level. There seems to be limited problems with 
normality, as only price premium have a kurtosis value above the critical limit 
(Table 7).  Overall, the data possess the qualities for pursuing further analysis. 
 
 
 
5.3.1.2 Correlation check 
According to Janssens et al. (2008, 255) a factor analysis is only significant if the 
variables involved is sufficiently correlated to one another. Therefore we check 
the correlations between the items and utilize the Bartlett’s test of sphericity and 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin test to check for adequate correlations.  
 
We check the correlation coefficients to identify the strength of the linear 
relationship between our different variables. The coefficients can take any value 
between -1 and +1. -1 represents a perfect negative correlation and +1 represents a 
perfect positive correlation. If the correlation coefficients represent a value of 0, 
Table 6: Skewness and kurtosis values on item level
Mean Standard Deviation Skewness Kurtosis
PP_2 2.064 1.216 1.542 2.540
PP_3 2.035 1.232 1.556 2.445
PP_4 2.165 1.363 1.518 2.124
Qual_1 6.156 1.121 -1.499 2.462
Brandinv_2 1.956 1.291 1.704 3.002
Brandcred_3 6.019 .971 -1.448 3.231
Markturb_3 6.215 1.072 -2.109 6.072
PA_1 5.791 1.280 -1.646 3.431
Table 7: Skewness and kurtosis values on construct level
Mean Standard Deviation Skewness Kurtosis
Price Premium 2,332 1,089 1,324 2,471
Quality 5,481 .882 -.411 .064
Reputation 5,856 .745 -.418 -.177
Punishment 4,241 1,612 -.128 -.609
Brand Investments 2,057 1,106 1,051 .475
Brand Credibility 6,160 .722 -.667 -.082
Switching Costs 5,006 1,330 -.399 -.120
Environmental Uncertainty 3,710 1,034 -.102 -.248
Information Costs Saved 5,589 .950 -.211 -.462
Market Turbulence 4,442 .764 -.509 1,818
Performance Ambiguity 4,102 1,087 -.307 .305
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the variables are perfectly independent (Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill 2009, 
459). The correlation matrix demonstrates that we have several significant 
correlations in our dataset  (Table 8).  
 
 
 
Bartlett’s test of sphericity attempts to determine whether there is a high enough 
degree of correlation between at least a number of the variables (Janssens et al. 
2008, 255). We propose the following hypotheses:  
 
H0: The variables are uncorrelated. 
Ha: The variables are correlated. 
 
In our current example the null hypothesis is rejected (p < .05), therefore factor 
analysis is meaningful (Table 9). Another measure used to determine the degree of 
correlation between the variables and the applicability of factor analysis is the 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin test (Janssens et al. 2008, 256). According to Malhotra 
(2010, 638), the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin value should be between .5 and 1 for factor 
analysis to be appropriate. This is satisfied as the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin value is 
.709 (Table 9). 
 
 
 
5.3.1.3 Sample size  
One of the prerequisites to perform a factor analysis regards the number of 
observations per variable. The rule of thumb is that for every variable there should 
be ten times as many observations and a minimum of 100 observations (Janssens 
Table 8: Correlation Matrix
Constructs 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1. Price Premium 1.000
2. Quality -.138 1.000
3. Reputation -.013 .491** 1.000
4. Punishment .031 .032 .073 1.000
5. Brand Investments .129 .058 .007 .163* 1.000
6. Brand Credibility -.137 .490** .640** .132 .025 1.000
7. Switching Costs .027 .160* .085 .011 .099 .069 1.000
8. Environmental Uncertainty .115 .166* .129 .052 .169* .131 .174* 1.000
9. Information Costs Saved -.024 .456** .352** -.103 .054 .439** .179* .128 1.000
10. Market Turbulence -.039 -.065 .012 .250** .278** .033 .042 .136 .018 1.000
11. Performance Ambiguity .219** -.251** -.062 -.096 -.067 -.159* .085 .298** -.182* .123 1.000
* Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed).
** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed).
Table 9: KMO and Bartlett's Test
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. .709
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity Approx. Chi-Square 2.738E3
Df 780
Sig. 0
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et al. 2008, 247). We fulfill both requirements as we have 161 observations for 
each variable.  
 
As the aforementioned requirements are met, we conclude that the data is 
appropriate for factor analysis. Although kurtosis is present in some items, we 
keep this in mind for the continuing part of the data analysis. Correlation exists 
between the different variables, making the data suitable for factor analysis. 
Finally, the sample size is applicable for performing several statistical tests . 
 
5.3.2 Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) 
We conducted an EFA to check if there exists any pattern between our 
hypothesized variables or not. We used Principal Components as the factor 
extraction method as this is the most commonly used method (Gripsrud, Olsson, 
and Silkoset 2004, 334). As we have predefined variables, we forced SPSS to 
extract 11 factors as recommended by Janssens et al. (2008, 253). We applied the 
Varimax factor rotation method as this is the most commonly used method 
(Gripsrud, Olsson, and Silkoset 2004, 334). Lastly, we forced SPSS to suppress 
absolute coefficient values below .30. According to Hair et al. (2010, 117) factor 
loadings in the range of ±.30 to ±.40 are considered to meet the minimal level for 
interpretation of factor structure. Furthermore, loadings ±.50 or above are 
considered practically significant. Based on our sample size of 161, Hair et al. 
(2010, 117) recommend a factor loading of approximately .45.  The results from 
the EFA can be found in Table 10.  
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The following items load on multiple components: Qual_1, Rep_1, Rep_2, 
Brandcred_3, Enviruncert_1, Enviruncert_2, Infocost_1, Markturb_1, and PA_1.  
Also, Enviruncert_1, Markturb_4 and PA_1 have factor loadings below .45, but 
are still within the minimal level for interpretation. The findings from the EFA are 
summarized in Table 11.  
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
PP_1 .595
PP_2 .894
PP_3 .867
PP_4 .873
Qual_1 .394 .507
Qual_2 .706
Qual_3 .706
Qual_4 .779
Rep_1 .684 .416
Rep_2 .471 .32 .337
Rep_3 .788
Pun_1 .846
Pun_2 .825
Brandinv_1 .892
Brandinv_2 .672
Brandinv_3 .895
Brandcred_1 .818
Brandcred_2 .866
Brandcred_3 .587 .394
Switchcost_1 .911
Switchcost_2 .882
Enviruncert_1 .328 .315 -.429
Enviruncert_2 .598 -.368
Enviruncert_3 .847
Enviruncert_4 .744
Enviruncert_5 .805
Infocost_1 .308 .482
Infocost_2 .515
Infocost_3 .723
Markturb_1 .468 -.428
Markturb_2 .653
Markturb_3 .658
Markturb_4 .321
PA_1 .429 .437 -.396
PA_2 .709
PA_3 .665
PA_4 .712
PA_5 .608
PA_6 .666
PA_7 .572
Table 10: Rotated Component Matrix
Component
Table 11: EFA summary
Variable name Significant factor loadings and clear pattern of interpretation
Price Premium Yes
Performance Ambiguity Yes
Quality Yes
Reputation No
Punishment Yes
Brand Investments Yes
Brand Credibility No
Switching Costs Yes
Environmental Uncertainty No
Information Costs Saved Yes
Market Turbulence No
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The EFA reveals a pattern where some of the variables behave differently than 
expected. This is common and normal as we operate with a large number of 
variables in our research (Meeting with Bengt G Lorentzen, 9.6.2011).  
 
In order to test reliability, we perform the Cronbach’s Alpha test. According to 
Hair et al. (2010, 92) the lower limit of acceptability is .60. All of our variables 
with their respective items are above this limit, except for market turbulence with 
a Cronbach’s Alpha of .241 (Table 12). The article from Jaworski and Kohli 
(1993) that we base our questions upon obtains a reliability estimate of .68 for the 
same variable. To deal with this problem, we stepwise remove items to check if 
the Cronbach’s Alpha increases, as recommended by Janssens et al. (2008, 274).  
 
 
 
We experience only minor changes to the overall Cronbach’s Alpha, when 
stepwise removing the different items. In summary, we remove the construct 
market turbulence. When conducting the normality test, Markturb_3 displayed a 
high level of kurtosis (Table 6). Performing the EFA demonstrates that market 
turbulence load on several components, without displaying a clear pattern (Table 
10). Finally, market turbulence has the lowest level of reliability (Table 12). 
 
5.3.3 Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA)  
CFA is a way of testing how well measured variables represent a smaller number 
of constructs. We perform a CFA in order to specify both the number of factors 
that exist for a set of variables and which factor each variable will load on before 
results can be computed. According to Jöreskog and Sörbom  (1993, xxiii) CFA 
enables one to test whether relationships expected on theoretical grounds actually 
Table 12: Cronbach’s Alpha
Variable name Number of items Cronbach’s Alpha
Price Premium 4 .836
Performance Ambiguity 7 .773
Quality 4 .656
Reputation 3 .721
Punishment 2 .810
Brand Investments 3 .816
Brand Credibility 3 .807
Switching Costs 2 .837
Environmental Uncertainty 5 .609
Information Costs Saved 3 .643
Market Turbulence 4 .241
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appear in the data. CFA is a tool that enables us to either “confirm” or “reject” our 
preconceived theory (Hair et al. 2010, 693).  
 
Before running a CFA in LISREL, we made a selection of which estimation 
method to use. We chose the default and most widely used method, namely 
Maximum Likelihood (Diamantopoulos and Siguaw 2000, 56). As all our items 
are based on a Likert scale, we forced LISREL to change the scale from ordinal to 
continuous. Analyzing continuous data allows for stronger comparisons and 
conclusions than analyzing ordinal data (Gripsrud, Olsson, and Silkoset 2004, 
125-127).  
 
We conducted a CFA for testing our measurement model. We check for fit and 
model modifications. After that we address overall measurement model fit.  
 
5.3.3.1 Performing Confirmatory Factor Analysis  
We imported 36 items with 10 latent variables from SPSS to LISREL. The first 
item in every variable is fixed to 1, with the purpose of scaling. We examined the 
parameter estimates to see if there are any unreasonable values or other anomalies 
(Jöreskog and Sörbom 1993, 121). In order to assess this, we check for 
standardized regression coefficients and t-values of the indicators. According to 
Hair et al. (2010, 709) a rule of thumb is that standardized regression coefficients 
should be .5 or higher, and ideally .7 or higher. All standardized regression 
coefficients are above the rule of thumb, except from Qual to item Qual_2 and 
from Eunc to item Eunc_5 (Appendix 5). All t-values are above the critical value 
of 1.96 recommended by Wenstøp (2003, 407) except from Eunc to item Eunc_5 
(Appendix 6). Therefore, we exclude item Eunc_5 from the model. We do not 
exclude item Qual_2 as it is close to .5 and have a significant t-value. Overall, this 
exclusion gave a better model fit (Appendix 7). However, some of the items had a 
standardized regression coefficient value over 1. Hair et al. (2010, 713) argue that 
this can be troublesome. To overcome this problem we defined the error variance 
of the items Pun_2, Binv_2 and Scost_2 to 0 (Appendix 8).  
 
5.3.3.2 Overall measurement model fit  
The Goodness-of-Fit (GOF) for the measurement model can by determined by 
several indices. When evaluating if the measurement model fits the data, we 
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analyze chi-square, degrees of freedom (df), and RMSEA. We apply the chi-
square test for overall model fit. Chi-square forms the basis for many other GOF-
tests, as it is the only measure that is directly testing its significance. Since chi-
square is a function of the sample size, we evaluate the impact of N. In our case, 
N = 161, which is less than 500, indicating that chi-square can be used as a good 
basis of estimation (Hair et al. 2006, 748).  
 
A small chi-square corresponds to a good fit, and a large chi-square to a bad fit 
(Jöreskog and Sörbom 1993, 122). In this case, the chi-square equals 821.21 
indicating a bad fit (Table 13). However, chi-square is affected by sample size, 
and should therefore be compared to df. Therefore, one can look at the ratio 
between chi-square and df. Our chi-square (821.21) / df (528) (Table 13) equals 
1.55, within the acceptable range between 1 and 2 (Biong and Selnes 1997). Hair 
et al. (2010, 721) states that a number smaller than 2 is considered very good. 1.55 
suggests an acceptable fit for the CFA model. 
 
Chi-square is just one of many tests of fit, and we cannot make a conclusion on 
just one statistical test (Hair et al. 2010, 672). RMSEA is less sensitive to sample 
size, and is therefore evaluated (Hair et al. 2010, 667). RMSEA indicates how 
well the model approximates the data. Lower RMSEA values indicate better fit 
(Hair et al. 2010, 667). The rule of thumb is that a RMSEA below .05 is a close 
fit, and values between .05 and .08 are an approximate fit (Jöreskog and Sörbom 
1993, 124). The RMSEA is .059 which indicates an approximate fit, signaling that 
we have a good model (Table 13). 
 
 
 
Based on the fit-indices we accept the model. Therefore, we do not perform any 
further modifications to the model. We continue with Structural Equation 
Modeling (SEM). 
 
 
Table 13: Test statistics measurment model
Test statistics Chi-square df RMSEA
Measurement model 821.21 528 .059
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Chapter 6 Results 
In the following chapter we perform and discuss the results from the SEM model. 
We present the model fit before testing whether or not performance ambiguity has 
an effect on our model. Lastly, we test the hypotheses from the SEM model. 
 
6.1 Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) 
SEM is a family of statistical models that seeks to explain the relationships among 
multiple variables, by combining factor analysis and multiple regression (Hair et 
al. 2010, 634). SEM is particularly useful in testing theories that contain multiple 
equations involving dependence relationships (Hair et al. 2006, 706). We analyze 
data from two samples, namely external OHS units and internal OHS units 
simultaneously. In LISREL, we use a path diagram to estimate the different 
relationships in the SEM model. According to Hair et al. (2010, 634) a path 
diagram is the visual representation of a model and the complete set of 
relationships among the models constructs.  
 
6.1.1 SEM model fit  
To check for SEM model fit we analyze chi-square, df, and RMSEA. The 
estimated chi-square for the SEM model is 1430.24 (Table 14) and the sample 
size is the same as for the CFA model (N=161). This is less than 500, indicating 
that chi-square can be used as a good basis of estimation (Hair et al. 2006, 748). 
The chi-square for the model is large, and can be interpreted as a bad fit (Jöreskog 
and Sörbom 1993, 122). However, we compare the ratio between chi-square and 
df. The ratio chi-square (1430.24) / df (1138) (Table 6) equals 1.26. This is within 
the acceptable range between 1 and 2 (Biong and Selnes 1997). In addition, Hair 
et al. (2010, 721) state that a number smaller than 2 is considered very good. 1.26 
suggests an acceptable fit for the SEM model.  
 
To avoid to fallacy of making a conclusion base on just one statistical test, we 
look at the RMSEA for the SEM model. The RMSEA is .057 (Table 14). This 
indicates an approximate fit (Jöreskog and Sörbom 1993, 124). Based on these fit-
indices we accept the SEM model. The modification indices in LISREL suggest 
adding different paths between the items and the variables. Various modification 
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attempts did not result in a better overall model fit. Therefore we keep the model 
as it is.  
 
 
 
In Table 15, we present SEM statistics. We see that some of the standardized 
regression coefficients exceed 1 and some are less than .50. This might indicate 
that something is wrong with the data. Hair et al. (2006, 796) postulate that 
removing items may not always be the best solution as one must look at the 
importance of the items and how these statements are described. As we did not 
discover any other problems with the items and most of our items are within the 
acceptable level, we decide to keep all of the items. A visual representation with 
standardized regression coefficients and t-values separated between external and 
internal OHS units can be found in Appendix 9 to 12.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 14: Test statistics SEM model
Test statistics Chi-square df RMSEA
SEM model 1430.24 1138 .057
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6.1.2 SEM model without Performance Ambiguity 
Finally, we examined the model excluding the variable performance ambiguity, in 
order to confirm whether it has an important effect on our model. By excluding 
performance ambiguity, we noticed that fewer variables were significant 
(Appendix 13 and Appendix 14). In terms of internal OHS units, only one 
variable is significant at the 10% level instead of two in the model with 
performance ambiguity. For external OHS units, only one variable is significant 
without performance ambiguity at the 10% level compared with four significant 
variables in the model with performance ambiguity. Also, we observed that the 
Table 15: SEM Statistics
Internal OHS External OHS Internal OHS External OHS
Paths
Performance Ambiguity – Price Premium .19 .30 1.09 2.90
Quality – Performance Ambiguity -.28 -.44 -.49 -1.13
Reputation – Performance Ambiguity .15 .27 .30 .83
Punishment - Performance Ambiguity .06 -.07 .40 -.66
Brand Investments – Brand Credibility .03 .00 .17 .03
Brand Credibility  - Price Premium -.25 -.05 -1.59 -.56
Switching Costs – Performance Ambiguity -.05 .15 -.28 1.47
Environmental Uncertainty – Performance Ambiguity .40 .29 2.02 2.38
Information Costs Saved – Performance Ambiguity -.01 -.32 -.04 -1.69
Items
PP_1 .63 .63 n/a n/a
PP_2 .82 .97 8.35 14.11
PP_3 .80 .88 7.12 12.09
PP_4 .73 .89 6.73 12.11
PA_1 .65 .65 n/a n/a
PA_2 .76 .78 5.68 9.33
PA_3 .74 .70 5.24 8.29
PA_4 .76 .63 5.13 7.31
PA_5 .40 .64 2.81 7.00
PA_6 .70 .65 6.80 7.48
PA_7 .55 .66 3.81 7.36
Qual_1 .73 .73 n/a n/a
Qual_2 .53 .49 3.69 5.50
Qual_3 .63 .59 4.64 6.90
Qual_4 .91 .80 8.14 11.61
Rep_1 .85 .85 n/a n/a
Rep_2 .67 .73 5.51 9.34
Rep_3 .86 .74 7.28 10.18
Pun_1 .62 .62 n/a n/a
Pun_2 1.05 .98 6.89 7.03
Binv_1 .80 .80 n/a n/a
Binv_2 .40 .51 2.93 6.00
Binv_3 .97 1.01 12.9 20.79
Bcred_1 .95 .95 n/a n/a
Bcred_2 .98 .89 11.41 14.85
Bcred_3 .82 .58 6.57 7.85
Scost_1 .70 .70 n/a n/a
Scost_2 1.12 .95 11.58 18.59
Eunc_1 .53 .53 n/a n/a
Eunc_2 .67 .55 4.48 6.16
Eunc_3 .79 .90 6.80 10.91
Eunc_4 .79 .66 5.59 7.77
Icost_1 .82 .82 n/a n/a
Icost_2 .73 .47 4.79 5.02
Icost_3 .73 .47 4.80 4.99
Standardized regression coefficients t-values
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model has a higher RMSEA value without performance ambiguity, indicating a 
worse fit (Table 16). The ratio chi-square (964.4) / df (704) (Table 16) with the 
exclusion of performance ambiguity equals 1.37. This is higher compared with the 
model with performance ambiguity. Overall, the model fit has weakened, 
demonstrating that performance ambiguity has an impact on our model and should 
therefore be included.  
 
 
 
6.2 Test of the hypotheses 
We test the hypotheses on the 10% level, with a t-value of 1.29 (Gripsrud, Olsson, 
and Silkoset 2004, 386). Table 17 presents the results of the hypotheses testing.  
 
 
 
H1a: External OHS units experience a positive impact from performance 
ambiguity on price premium. The standardized regression coefficient is .30, 
indicating a positive covariance between performance ambiguity and price 
premium. The positive impact of performance ambiguity on price premium is 
significant (t = 2.90, p < .01). Hence, H1a is statistically supported.  
 
Table 16: Test statistics, comparison of SEM models
Test statistics Chi-square df RMSEA
SEM model without Performance Ambiguity 964.4 704 .068
SEM model with Performance Ambiguity 1430.24 1138 .057
Table 17: Summary of the findings related to the hypotheses
Hs Paths
Standardized 
regression 
coefficients t-values Findings
H1a Performance Ambiguity – Price Premium (External) .30 2.90*** Supported
H1b Performance Ambiguity – Price Premium (Internal) .19 1.09 Supportedᵃ
H2a Quality – Performance Ambiguity (External) -.44 -1.13 Not supported
H2b Quality – Performance Ambiguity (Internal) -.28 -.49 Supportedᵃ
H3a Reputation – Performance Ambiguity (External) .27 .83 Not supported
H3b Reputation – Performance Ambiguity (Internal) .15 .30 Supportedᵃ
H4a Punishment - Performance Ambiguity (External) -.07 -.66 Not Supported
H4b Punishment - Performance Ambiguity (Internal) .06 .40 Supportedᵃ
H5a Brand Investments – Brand Credibility (External) .00 .03 Not supported
H5b Brand Investments – Brand Credibility (Internal) .03 .17 Supportedᵃ
H5c Brand Credibility  - Price Premium (External) -.05 -.56 Not Supported
H5d Brand Credibility  - Price Premium (Internal) -.25 -1.59* Supported
H6a Switching Costs – Performance Ambiguity (External) .15 1.47* Supported
H6b Switching Costs – Performance Ambiguity (Internal) -.05 -.28 Supportedᵃ
H7a Environmental Uncertainty – Performance Ambiguity (External) .29 2.38*** Supported
H7b Environmental Uncertainty – Performance Ambiguity (Internal) .40 2.02** Not Supported
H8a Information Costs Saved – Performance Ambiguity (External) -.32 -1.69** Not Supported
H8b Information Costs Saved – Performance Ambiguity (Internal) -.01 -.04 Supportedᵃ
H9a Market Turbulence – Performance Ambiguity (External) n/a n/a n/a
H9b Market Turbulence – Performance Ambiguity (Internal) n/a n/a n/a
ᵃ Supported. However, not statistically supported. Refer to hypothesis
*p < .1
**p < .05
***p < .01
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H1b: Internal OHS units do not experience a positive impact from performance 
ambiguity on price premium. The standardized regression coefficient is .19, 
representing a positive covariance between performance ambiguity and price 
premium. The impact of performance ambiguity on price premium is not 
significant (t = 1.09, p > .1) However, we argue that there is no positive impact 
from performance ambiguity to price premium with internal OHS units. 
Therefore, H1b is supported. 
 
To investigate whether external OHS units experience a stronger positive impact 
of price premium compared with internal OHS units we perform an independent 
samples t-test (Table 18). We argue that external OHS units experience a stronger 
impact of price premium compared with internal OHS units (Ho). To assess the 
statistical significance between external OHS units and internal OHS units on 
price premium we examine the one-tailed significance value. The value is .289 
(.577/2), which is higher than the alpha of .05. Therefore, we cannot reject Ho, 
indicating that external OHS units experience a stronger positive impact of price 
premium than internal OHS units.   
 
 
 
H2a: External OHS units experience a positive impact from quality on 
performance ambiguity. The standardized regression coefficient is -.44, indicating 
a negative covariance between quality and performance ambiguity. The impact of 
quality on performance ambiguity is insignificant (t = -1.13, p > .1). We thereby 
reject H2a. 
 
H2b: Internal OHS units do not experience a positive impact from quality on 
performance ambiguity. The standardized regression coefficient is -.28, indicating 
a negative covariance between quality and performance ambiguity. The impact of 
quality on performance ambiguity is insignificant (t = -.49, p > .1). H2b is 
therefore supported.  
Table 18: Independent samples t-test
Lower Upper
Price 
premium
Equal 
variances 
assumed
.025 .876 .559 159 .577 .10720 .19173 -.27146 .48586
95% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference
Levene's Test for 
Equality of Variances
t-test for Equality of Means
F Sig. t df
Sig. (2-
tailed)
Mean 
Difference
Std. Error 
Difference
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H3a: External OHS units experience a positive impact from reputation on 
performance ambiguity. The standardized regression coefficient is .27, indicating 
a positive covariance between reputation and performance ambiguity. The impact 
of reputation on performance ambiguity is insignificant (t = .83, p > .1). This 
results in the rejection of H3a.  
 
H3b: Internal OHS units do not experience a positive impact from reputation on 
performance ambiguity. The standardized regression coefficient is .15, indicating 
a positive covariance between reputation and performance ambiguity. The impact 
of reputation on performance ambiguity is insignificant (t = .30, p > .1). H3b is 
therefore supported. 
 
H4a: External OHS units experience a negative impact from punishment on 
performance ambiguity. The standardized regression coefficient is -.07, indicating 
a negative covariance between punishment and performance ambiguity. The 
impact of punishment on performance ambiguity is insignificant (t = -.66, p > .1). 
We thereby reject H4a. 
 
H4b: Internal OHS units do not experience a negative impact from punishment on 
performance ambiguity. The standardized regression coefficient is .06, indicating 
a positive covariance between punishment and performance ambiguity. The 
impact of punishment on performance ambiguity is insignificant (t = .40, p > .1). 
H4b is therefore supported. 
 
H5a: External OHS units experience a positive impact from brand investments on 
brand credibility. The standardized regression coefficient is .00, indicating no 
covariance between brand investments and brand credibility. The impact of brand 
investments on brand credibility is insignificant (t = .03, p > .1). Therefore H5a is 
rejected.   
 
H5b: Internal OHS units do not experience a positive impact from brand 
investments on brand credibility. The standardized regression coefficient is .03, 
indicating a positive covariance between brand investments and brand credibility. 
The impact of brand investments on brand credibility is insignificant (t = .17, p > 
.1). H5b is therefore supported. 
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H5c: External OHS units experience a positive impact from brand credibility on 
price premium. The standardized regression coefficient is -.05, indicating a 
negative covariance between brand credibility and price premium. The impact of 
brand credibility on price premium is insignificant (t = -.56, p > .1). H5c is 
therefore rejected.  
 
H5d: Internal OHS units do not experience a positive impact from brand 
credibility on price premium. The standardized regression coefficient is -.25, 
indicating a negative covariance between brand credibility and price premium. 
The negative impact of brand credibility on price premium is significant (t = -
1.59, p < .1). The impact is in the opposite direction of what we expected. 
Therefore, H5d is statistically supported.   
 
H6a: External OHS units experience a positive impact from switching costs on 
performance ambiguity. The standardized regression coefficient is .15, indicating 
a positive covariance between switching costs and performance ambiguity. The 
positive impact of switching costs on performance ambiguity is significant (t = 
1.47, p < .1). H6a is therefore statistically supported.   
 
H6b: Internal OHS units do not experience a positive impact from switching costs 
on performance ambiguity. The standardized regression coefficient is -.05, 
indicating a negative covariance between switching costs and performance 
ambiguity. The impact of switching costs on performance ambiguity is 
insignificant (t = -.28, p > .1). H6b is therefore supported.  
 
H7a: External OHS units experience a positive impact from environmental 
uncertainty on performance ambiguity. The standardized regression coefficient is 
.29, indicating a positive covariance between environmental uncertainty and 
performance ambiguity. The positive impact of environmental uncertainty on 
performance ambiguity is significant (t = 2.38, p < .01). H7a is therefore 
statistically supported. 
 
H7b: Internal OHS units do not experience a positive impact from environmental 
uncertainty on performance ambiguity. The standardized regression coefficient is 
.40, indicating a positive covariance between environmental uncertainty and 
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performance ambiguity. The positive impact of environmental uncertainty on 
performance ambiguity is significant (t = 2.02, p < .05). This is the opposite of 
what we hypothesized, therefore we reject H7b. 
 
H8a: External OHS units experience a positive impact from information costs 
saved on performance ambiguity. The standardized regression coefficient is -.32, 
indicating a negative covariance between information costs saved and 
performance ambiguity. The negative impact of information costs saved on 
performance ambiguity is significant (t = -1.69, p < .05). This is the opposite of 
what we hypothesized, therefore we reject H8a. 
 
H8b: Internal OHS units do not experience a positive impact from information 
costs saved on performance ambiguity. The standardized regression coefficient is 
-.01, indicating a negative covariance between information costs saved and 
performance ambiguity. The impact of information costs saved on performance 
ambiguity is insignificant (t = -.04, p > .1). H8b is therefore supported. 
 
H9a-b: External/Internal OHS units experience a positive/negative impact from 
market turbulence on performance ambiguity. As we removed market turbulence, 
we cannot perform statistical tests or hypotheses testing. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GRA 19002 Master Thesis  1.9.2011 
Page 54 
Chapter 7 Discussion 
In this chapter we first discuss how our findings contribute to the theories we rely 
on in the thesis. Then, we propose the central findings of the study, in connection 
with relevant existing literature by investigating the relationships stipulated in the 
research model. We address findings for both internal OHS units and external 
OHS units. Thereafter, we present theoretical and managerial implications.  
 
7.1 General discussion 
Our findings show that several factors influence the level of performance 
ambiguity. Therefore, our results extend current research on performance 
ambiguity. Furthermore, our results support the findings of Mishra, Heide and 
Cort (1998) that a link exists between performance ambiguity and price premium. 
However, we refine the knowledge surrounding performance ambiguity and price 
premiums in relation with transaction cost theory. Specifically, our results extend 
the issues of make or buy decisions in a previously under-studied market. Our 
results show that factors influence performance ambiguity and price premium 
differently depending on whether companies pursue make or buy strategies. We 
now discuss the specific relationships specified in the research model.         
 
7.1.1 Performance Ambiguity and Price Premium 
Both hypotheses concerning performance ambiguity and its relation with price 
premium were supported. This indicates that performance ambiguity has a 
significant effect for external OHS units whilst it has no effect for internal OHS 
units on price premium. For external OHS units this is aligned with the results of 
Mishra, Heide and Cort (1998) who find that the greater the level performance 
ambiguity the greater the magnitude of price premiums. Our findings suggest that 
buyers exist that are willing to pay a price premium to overcome the problems of 
performance ambiguity. Our results are consistent with Snow (2010) and Zeithaml 
(1988) who argue that risk averters readily pay a price premium to reduce 
ambiguity. As the OHS services possess credence properties, buyers try to protect 
themselves by paying a price premium. We agree with Spence (2002) and 
Kirmani and Rao (2000) that the signal effect of charging a price premium may be 
used to reduce problems with performance ambiguity, as it can distinguish low-
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quality providers from high-quality providers in the OHS market. When it comes 
to internal OHS units we found what we expected, that they have no effect of 
using price premiums to reduce performance ambiguity, as they are owned by 
their parent company.         
 
7.1.2 Quality and Performance Ambiguity 
In contrast to our predictions, there is no significant positive impact from quality 
on performance ambiguity for external OHS units. We argued that signaling 
quality could help buyers in selecting an external OHS unit and thus reduce 
performance ambiguity. However, this argument is based on the premise that 
buyers could evaluate the quality of OHS units. Darby and Karni (1973) suggest 
that it is difficult to judge credence services. Following this statement, one reason 
for quality not having a significant impact on performance ambiguity might be 
that buyers are not able to judge the service quality of different OHS units. Our 
findings suggest that quality cannot be used as a signaling strategy for external 
OHS units, in order to overcome problems with performance ambiguity. This 
contrasts with the findings of Spence (2002) and Kirmani and Rao (2000). To 
conclude, the results from our study indicate that buyers experience no reduction 
in performance ambiguity when external OHS units try to signal their level of 
quality. For internal OHS units we find support for our hypothesis, that they do 
not experience a positive impact from quality on performance ambiguity. As they 
are owned by the company that is responsible for the quality evaluation, the 
incentives for evaluating and comparing the level of quality might be absent. 
 
7.1.3 Reputation and Performance Ambiguity 
Our results show that reputation has no significant positive impact on 
performance ambiguity for external OHS and internal OHS units. For external 
OHS units this is opposite to our assumption that reputation might be one way to 
reduce performance ambiguity in the market. Our findings contrasts Shapiro 
(1982, 1983) who claims that reputation can be used to overcome the problems of 
performance ambiguity. There might be some explanations why we do not find 
significant results. Herbig and Milewicz (1993) argue that consumers use 
reputation to infer product quality. The effect of utilizing reputation to reduce 
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performance ambiguity can be weakened, as customers cannot infer the quality of 
the services provided by OHS units. Shapiro (1983) notes that buyers might use 
the quality of the services provided by a company as an indicator of reputation. 
Furthermore, reputation depends on initial beliefs and observation of a company’s 
past behavior (Herbig and Milewicz 1993). As services delivered by OHS units 
are complex and intangible, it becomes difficult to evaluate a company’s past 
behavior and quality. Hence, establishing a reputation in the marketplace might be 
challenging. Because of this, using reputation as a signaling tool is not likely to 
reduce performance ambiguity. For internal OHS units the findings are aligned 
with the hypothesis. Internal OHS units do not experience a positive impact from 
reputation on performance ambiguity. As they are owned by their parent company 
signaling a reputation becomes less important because there is less performance 
ambiguity present within a company.  
 
7.1.4 Punishment and Performance Ambiguity 
In contrast with the hypothesis, external OHS units do not experience a significant 
negative impact from punishment on performance ambiguity. Our results indicate 
that using punishment as a tool to prevent cheating and thus reduce performance 
ambiguity is not widely used in the OHS market. We believed that the mechanism 
for detecting cheating would have a stronger impact for external OHS units. Our 
findings suggest the opposite. A possible explanation for this could be that buyers 
cannot evaluate the true level of quality, and thereby find it hard to detect and 
punish cheating. According to NIOH, buyers change their OHS units more 
frequently nowadays (Meeting with NIOH, 23.6.2010). However, our findings 
disprove our belief that the switching behavior relates to cheating in the 
marketplace. As expected, internal OHS units do not experience a negative impact 
from punishment on performance ambiguity. We believe that this is because 
internal OHS units are less likely to cheat their owners. 
 
7.1.5 Brand Investments and Brand Credibility  
Our findings show that external OHS units, in contrast to what we expected, do 
not experience a positive impact from brand investments on brand credibility. 
This differs from the findings of Erdem and Swait (1998) and Erdem, Swait and 
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Louviere (2002), who postulate that sellers may improve brand credibility by 
brand investments. A possible explanation is that OHS units spend limited 
resources on marketing efforts, such as brand investments. NIOH claimed that 
OHS units have traditionally paid little attention to marketing (Meeting with 
NIOH, 23.6.2010). Our findings indicate that this lack of focus on marketing has 
not changed. Erdem and Swait (1998) argue that brand credibility is one of the 
most important choice criteria for buyers. This is especially when a market has 
imperfect and asymmetric information, as the OHS market possesses. However, 
our results show that brand credibility is not used as a criterion in decision 
making. This could be due to the aforementioned lack of focus on marketing by 
sellers, and that buyers have difficulties evaluating information cues from OHS 
units. For internal OHS units the findings are consistent with the hypothesis. Since 
internal OHS units are owned by the parent company, the incentives for branding 
their services are absent. In addition, internal OHS units might not care as much 
about marketing, because they believe they face little competition.  
 
7.1.6 Brand Credibility and Price Premium  
We expected that external OHS units would experience a positive impact from 
brand credibility on price premium. Interestingly, our findings differ from our 
expectations. As argued previously, brand credibility does not seem to play an 
important role in the OHS market. Due to this, brand credibility to price premium 
might be influenced from the beginning. One of the reasons we argued that brand 
credibility would positively impact price premium is that credible brands can 
reduce risk, and that some buyers are willing to pay a price premium to reduce 
uncertainty (Snow 2010). The logic stated by Keller (2008, 7) that a credible 
brand reduces the risk for buyers, simplifies selection and could potentially lead to 
price premiums is not statistically supported in our study. However, our findings 
support Erdem and Swait (1998), Rao and Monroe (1996) and Rao and Bergen 
(1992) who argue that buyers can rely on credible brands instead of paying price 
premiums to assure quality. The more a company has invested in building a 
credible brand the more the seller has to lose by cheating on quality (Erdem and 
Swait 1998). Our results indicate that buyers trust the image, that companies 
deliver high quality, and therefore are not willing to pay price premiums to assure 
quality. Internal OHS units experience a negative significant impact from brand 
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credibility on price premium. In other words, they see no value in branding their 
services to their parent company in order to gain a price premium.  
 
7.1.7 Switching Costs and Performance Ambiguity  
Both hypotheses regarding switching costs and its relation with performance 
ambiguity were supported. The results show that switching costs has a significant 
effect for external OHS units whilst it has no effect for internal OHS units on 
performance ambiguity. Our findings support our argument that it is easier for 
buyers of external OHS units to switch between sellers. Bendapudi and Berry 
(1997) argue that one is less willing to change if there is high cost of negotiating, 
monitoring and evaluating quality with higher levels of performance ambiguity. 
For external OHS units, our findings show that switching costs reduces 
performance ambiguity because buyers are not that committed to specific 
relationships. Therefore, the barriers for switching are lower for buyers of external 
OHS services compared with owners of internal OHS units. Consequently, owners 
of internal OHS units invest more in relationships and therefore are less likely to 
switch OHS units. Hence, switching costs do not reduce performance ambiguity 
for internal OHS units.  
 
7.1.8 Environmental Uncertainty and Performance Ambiguity  
As predicted, external OHS units experience a significant positive impact from 
environmental uncertainty on performance ambiguity. Surprisingly, internal OHS 
units also experience a significant positive impact in contrast to our expectations. 
For external OHS units the findings are consistent with the hypothesis, that the 
greater the environmental uncertainty the greater the performance ambiguity. The 
results corresponds with Milliken’s (1987) findings, arguing that organizations 
that are uncertain about their environment devote greater attention and resources 
to understanding the mechanisms operating in the market. Our findings suggest 
that buyers of external OHS services face such uncertainty, and therefore must 
deal with performance ambiguity by devoting resources to understand the market. 
By developing an understanding of the market, environmental uncertainty 
decreases. This will lead to a reduction of performance ambiguity. We argued that 
internal OHS units might not have the same incentives to monitor the market. This 
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is supported by our results. For instance, internal OHS units find it very difficult 
to predict the number of OHS providers in the market. The lack of incentives for 
monitoring the market creates more environmental uncertainty for internal OHS 
units, and thereby increases performance ambiguity. In addition, as internal OHS 
units are owned by their parent company our results indicate that they are less 
likely to deal with competition, again contributing to increase environmental 
uncertainty.  
 
7.1.9 Information Costs Saved and Performance Ambiguity  
In contrast to our predictions, external OHS units do not experience a positive 
impact from information costs saved on performance ambiguity. We argued that 
external OHS units would benefit the most from conveying credible information, 
in an attempt to reduce information costs for buyers. Our logic corresponds with 
Erdem and Swait (1998), who argue that such information could reduce 
information costs and thereby performance ambiguity. However, our results 
indicate the opposite. Since the impact from information costs saved on 
performance ambiguity is significantly negative, conveying information in an 
attempt to reduce information costs seems to have little effect on reducing 
performance ambiguity for buyers. One reason for this might be that buyers of 
external OHS units are not willing to incur information costs to reduce 
performance ambiguity. This is in contrast with the findings of Shugan (1980). 
Internal OHS units also do not experience a positive impact from information 
costs saved on performance ambiguity, however this was as expected. A reason 
for this might be that owners of internal OHS units believe that they can rely on 
the OHS unit, and that the OHS unit provides the services the owners want. 
Therefore they perceive that they have limited gains from searching for 
information from other alternatives. Such searching would only increase their 
costs, and not provide them with any additional value such as reduced 
performance ambiguity.  
 
7.2 Theoretical implications 
Pricing has received little academic investigation (Hinterhuber 2004). In addition, 
pricing strategies have remained an under-studied dimension both in its 
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conceptual dimension and in managerial practice (Solberg, Stöttinger, and Yaprak 
2006). In a study of major marking journals, Malhotra (1996) finds that less than 
2% of all articles investigate the subject of pricing. As such, our study within 
pricing contributes to the understanding of this under-studied concept.  
 
To our knowledge no study has focused on price premiums in relation with 
performance ambiguity in the OHS market. Our study extends current literature 
by investigating which factors causes price premiums, and how this is linked with 
performance ambiguity. An important theoretical implication from our findings is 
that price premiums can be used to overcome problems of performance ambiguity 
in a competitive market. Several studies have investigated the concept of price 
premium, and that risk averters exist who are willing to pay a price premium to 
overcome uncertainty (Snow 2010; Zeithaml 1988; Mishra, Heide, and Cort 1998; 
Rao and Bergen 1992; Rao and Monroe 1996; Klein and Leffler 1981). However, 
as far as we know, none has studied which factors influence performance 
ambiguity, and how performance ambiguity affect price premium through the 
indirect effect of factors influencing performance ambiguity. Instead, researchers 
have investigated the direct link between factors and price premium. For instance, 
Klein and Leffler (1981) study the link between quality and price premium. 
Therefore, our research enhances the knowledge concerning performance 
ambiguity, which in our opinion is an under-studied construct. Additionally, 
through our research we develop a more theoretical understanding of the link 
between performance ambiguity and price premium.  
 
A theoretical implication can also be related to our investigation of the 
relationships between brand investments and brand credibility, and brand 
credibility and price premium. The insignificant effect from brand investments on 
brand credibility contrasts with the results from Erdem and Swait (1998) and 
Erdem, Swait and Louviere (2002), who found that sellers may improve brand 
credibility by brand investments. Also, we found no positive effect from brand 
credibility on price premium. This is consistent with Rao and Monroe (1996) who 
found that buyers trust that company delivers high quality, and therefore are not 
willing to pay a price premium.  
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Another theoretical implication is that we have discovered that factors influence 
price premiums and performance ambiguity differently, depending on how 
companies purchase services. This builds upon transaction cost theory, where 
transactions are either performed within a company (make) or outside the 
company by other providers (buy) (Williamson 1975).We have investigated these 
differences through internal OHS units (make) and external OHS units (buy). 
Within this theoretical implication, an important finding is that price premiums 
only reduce performance ambiguity for companies purchasing services outside the 
firm. In summary, our results show that different factors have different effects on 
performance ambiguity, and thus price premium.  
 
7.3 Managerial implications 
As discussed previously, dealing with pricing represents one of the greatest 
challenges for managers (Smith et al. 1999). In the OHS market this problem is a 
truism, as OHS units have traditionally had little focus on marketing (Meeting 
with NIOH, 23.6.2010). Findings from our study reveal that OHS units still do not 
devote resources on marketing of their services. As price is an essential part of 
marketing (Perreault, Cannon, and McCarthy 2010, 38), a consequence is that 
price also has received limited attention in the OHS market. To the extent OHS 
units have considered price, it has only been to present it as the lowest possible 
cost for buyers, and not as a strategic variable. A general managerial implication 
is therefore to devote greater attention to pricing as a managerial function in the 
OHS market. This is consistent with Morris, Avila and Pitt (1996) who argue that 
price must become a strategic decision variable.  
 
The importance of price becomes even more evident when companies operate in 
turbulent markets (Morris, Avila, and Pitt 1996). Such turbulence creates 
performance ambiguity. Lie (2009) states that OHS units face intensified 
competition, and that buyers of OHS services are not able to separate effective 
OHS units from “charlatans”. These factors contribute to increase the degree of 
performance ambiguity in the OHS market and support the need for devoting 
greater attention to pricing.  
 
GRA 19002 Master Thesis  1.9.2011 
Page 62 
We agree with Morris, Avila and Pitt (1996) that pricing can create advantages for 
companies, only if managers develop a better understanding of the components 
that influence pricing. Our study highlights one sub-area of pricing, which is price 
premium and how it is related to performance ambiguity. Our managerial 
implications relate to factors creating advantages for companies, by reducing 
performance ambiguity and contribute to the ability to charge price premiums. 
One key finding that can help managers of external OHS units is that signaling a 
price premium can be used to overcome problems of performance ambiguity. This 
will make selection easier for buyers, as it reduces uncertainty.   
 
As branding activities did not result in increased credibility or contributions to 
price premium, we are tempted to recommend not focusing on marketing the 
services in the OHS market. However, we cannot draw the conclusion that 
companies should not devote resources on branding based on our findings. 
Generally, buyers prefer sellers with a credible brand that conveys quality (Erdem 
and Swait 1998). As branded sellers are more attractive, they are likely to increase 
market share and make it harder for competitors to attain profitable prices (Rao 
1993).  
 
Our findings indicate that buyers of external OHS services are less committed to 
long-term relationships with their OHS unit. A managerial implication for 
external OHS units is therefore to attempt to establish greater barriers, and thus 
increase switching cost for buyers. Such long-term relationships can be a potent 
source of income for external OHS units.  
 
We found that increased environmental uncertainty results in a higher degree of 
performance ambiguity. A recommendation is therefore that both internal and 
external OHS should devote resources to gain a better understanding of the market 
in which they operate, as this in turn this will reduce performance ambiguity.  
 
The new law regulations, and the findings from Lie (2009) suggest an increased 
competition in the OHS market. This is exemplified by the increased volume of 
profit-based OHS units in recent time. This poses some interesting developments 
in the market. We have argued that external OHS units face more competition and 
more performance ambiguity compared with internal OHS units. However, it is 
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likely that internal OHS units will be affected by increased competition. This 
development can lead to more similar conditions for the two types of OHS units. 
As internal OHS units have less experience with competition, they will face 
greater challenges with adapting to the new environment. The lack of market 
mechanisms for internal OHS units is likely to have prohibited innovation and the 
focus on operating efficiently. A managerial implication for internal OHS units is 
therefore to implement strategies and mechanisms for responding to a more 
competitive environment. Lastly, in order to be able to gain price premiums we 
recommend that both internal and external OHS units implement an external focus 
of pricing, with formal and ongoing monitoring efforts, as supported by Morris, 
Avila and Pitt (1996).               
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Chapter 8 Limitations and Future Research 
This study has a number of limitations. The data was partly collected from a 
voluntarily based registry, which means that we got responses from respondents 
that have actively shown an interest in the registry. This might have harmed the 
randomization of our research resulting in biased estimates. The overall response 
rate was sufficient for statistical analysis. However, we only obtained 45 
respondents from internal OHS units. This is lower than what we wanted. Despite 
this, we achieved a good overall model. We only got in touch with one respondent 
from each OHS unit. This could be problematic as the respondent might have 
given biased answers when responding on behalf of the unit. Also, we did not let 
respondents fill in comments in the questionnaire, which might have given us 
additional information. We did this on purpose, as we would have received too 
much qualitative data, which we would not have had time to investigate properly. 
Additionally, internal OHS units did not consider price in the manner we 
expected. As such, they had trouble responding to the questions regarding price 
premium. Moreover, the research was conducted in a single market and this will 
affect the generalizability of the results negatively.  
 
One area of future research that could give valuable insight is to replicate the 
study in other suitable markets. Researchers could check whether our findings 
hold outside the OHS market. In addition, researchers could investigate price 
premium and its link with performance ambiguity in different settings. 
Additionally, researcher could examine other factors that effect price premium 
and performance ambiguity that we did not incorporate in our study. For example, 
trust could play a role in reducing performance ambiguity. To gain an even more 
in-depth knowledge of the market, researchers could collect data not only from 
managers, but include customers in the study. Researchers could reveal if gaps 
exists between what managers think about price premiums compared with 
customers. We argued for increasing competition in the OHS market. Therefore, it 
would be interesting to conduct a follow-up study in order to investigate how 
competition impacts the way external and internal OHS units operate in order to 
gain price premiums.     
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Appendices 
Appendix 1 – Operationalization of the variables 
 
 
 
 
item label Question/Statement
descrpt 1 Er BHT hos dere….. A) Fellesordning B) Egenordning
descrpt 2 Privat eller offentlig bedrift
descrpt 3 Hvor mange  årsverk har dere i deres BHT?
descrpt 4 Fellesordning: Hvor mange bedrifter selger dere BHT tjenester til
descrpt 5 Størrelse på BHT i forhold til salg?
descrpt 6 Størrelse på BHTet i forhold til lønnsomhet?
descrpt 7 Årstall når  BHT ble etablert?
descrpt 8 Fellesordning: Hvor mange av deres ingåtte avtaler har blitt lagt ut på anbud?
premium_1 Våre kunder er villige til å betale en høyere pris enn hva som er normalt for liknende BHT tjenester
premium_2 Den prisen vi krever for BHT tjenester er betydelig høyere enn hva våre konkurrenter krever for tilsvarende BHT tjenester 
premium_3 Vi har de høyeste prisene innenfor BHT tjenester sammenlignet med prisen generelt i markedet
premium_4 Vår BHT krever en pris som totaltsett er høyere enn normalt for tilsvarende BHT tjenester
quality_1 Vår BHT mener at det å yte høy kvalitet er avgjørende for våre kunder
quality_2 Våre kunder vil pådra seg et betydelig tap dersom det viser seg at vi leverer tjenester av lav kvalitet
quality_3 Våre kunder forsikrer seg om at kvaliteten på våre tjenester er høy
quality_4 Tjenestene som leveres av vår BHT har generelt sett høy kvalitet
reputation_1 Vår BHT har et svært godt rykte i markedet
reputation_2 Vår BHT har et rykte for å levere tjenester som er svært gode sammenlignet med andre BHT selskaper
reputation_3 Vår BHT er meget pålitelig 
punish_1 Vår BHT vil oppleve et betydelig økonomisk tap dersom vi ikke leverer det vi har lovet
punish_2 Våre kunder vil svarteliste oss og ikke kjøpe våre tjenester dersom vi ikke leverer det vi har lovet
brandinvest_1 Vår BHT bruker årlig et betydelig beløp på markedsføring av oss selv
brandinvest_2 Vår BHT har investert betydelige beløp i lokalsamfunnet de siste årene
brandinvest_3 Vår BHT bruker årlig et betydelig beløp for å bli synliggjort i markedet 
brandcred_1 Vår BHT leverer hva vi lover
brandcred_2 Våre BHT tjenester oppfattes som troverdige
brandcred_3 Vår BHT har et merkenavn våre kunder stoler på 
Outsource_1a Egenordning: Vi forventer at vi kommer til å opprettholde vår nåværende BHT-avtale over lang tid kundeforhold til oss
Outsource_1b Fellesordning: Vi forventer at våre kunder ønsker et langt 
Outsource_2 Vi lager planer for å opprettholde et godt og langvarig kundeforhold
Switch cst_1 Det å utarbeide nye rutiner for å arbeide med en ny BHT vil ta mye tid og ressurser
Switch cst_2 Det å utarbeide effektive relasjoner med en ny BHT vil være en tidkrevende prosess
Envir_Uncertai_1 Det er meget vanskelig å forutsi hvor mange som tilbyr BHT tjenester i markedet
Envir_Uncertai_2 Konkurransen mellom BHT aktørene i det lokale markedet vi opererer i er meget hard
Envir_Uncertai_3 Det er mange markedsføringskriger i vår bransje
Envir_Uncertai_4 Priskrig er et kjennetegn i vår bransje
Envir_Uncertai_5 Våre konkurrenter er relativt svake
Info cost_Saved_1 Kundene vet hva de får fra vår BHT, noe som sparer dem tid brukt på å undersøke andre alternativer 
Info cost_Saved_2 Kundene vet at vår BHT er der også i fremtiden 
Info cost_Saved_3 Vår BHT gir kundene hva de ønsker, noe som sparer dem for tid og energi i å forsøke å finne andre alternativer 
Mark_Turb_1 Våre kunder er følsomme ovenfor pris
Mark_Turb_2 Vi opplever etterspørsel etter våre tjenester fra helt nye kunder som vi aldri har betjent tidligere
Mark_Turb_3 Vi betjener mange av de samme kundene som vi gjorde tidligere
Mark_Turb_4 Våre kunder ser etter nye BHT tjenester hele tiden
PA_1 Våre kunder må anta at de mottar høy kvalitet på tjenestene fra vår BHT
PA_2 Det er meget tidkrevende for en kunde å kontrollere hvor godt hver enkelt av våre ansatte utfører sitt arbeid
PA_3 Det er meget vanskelig for en kunde å vurdere det riktige omfanget av tjenestene som vår BHT foreslår
PA_4 Våre kunder vil aldri kunne vite hvor god kvaliteten på våre tjenester er før tjenestene er utført
PA_5 Det finnes ikke tilstrekkelig standarder for å måle kvalitet før kjøp av BHT tjenester
PA_6 Våre kunder har vanskelig for å fastsette kvalitetsnivået de har behov for når de kjøper BHT tjenester
PA_7 For den type BHT tjenester vår BHT leverer, kan kvaliteten på tjenestene kun observeres etter lang tids bruk
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Appendix 2 – Questionnaire 
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Appendix 3 – Cover letter 
 Masteroppgave om BHT markedet våren 2011 
  
Hei,  
Vi er to masterstudenter fra Handelshøyskolen BI som i samarbeid med 
Fagsekretariatet for bedriftshelsetjenesten ved Statens arbeidsmiljøinstitutt 
(NIOH) ønsker å kartlegge hva som leder til konkurranseforskjeller innenfor 
bedriftshelsetjenestene i Norge, heretter kalt BHT. Denne undersøkelsen er i regi 
av et forskningsprosjekt, ledet av Ragnhild Silkoset, førsteamuensis ved 
Handelshøyskolen BI. Fra Fagsekretariatet for bedriftshelsetjenesten 
samarbeider vi med Arve Lie og Odd Bjørnstad.  
 
Formålet med denne undersøkelsen er å avdekke hvilke faktorer som påvirker 
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prissettingen i BHT markedet og hvilke BHT leverandører som er i stand til å ta 
en høyere pris i markedet enn hva som er vanlig og bakgrunnen for at dette 
forekommer. Denne undersøkelsen gjennomføres i forbindelse med avsluttende 
masteroppgave på Handelshøyskolen BI.  
 
Ved å svare på dette spørreskjema bidrar du til å øke kvaliteten på studien. Som 
takk for at du fullfører undersøkelsen vil vi tilby deg og din bedrift en gratis 
rapport fra forskningen som beskriver funnene og implikasjonene. Resultatene 
fra rapporten kan være nyttig for videre utviklingsarbeid i deres BHT.  
 
Svarene i undersøkelsen behandles anonymt og resultatene vil kun brukes i 
forskningsøyemed. Det finnes ingen riktige eller gale svar og vi er ute etter din 
personlige mening.  
 
Skjemaet tar mellom 10 til 15 minutter å svare på.  
 
For spørsmål om denne undersøkelsen ta kontakt med Joakim eller Simen på 
email: joakim.lindberg@student.bi.no eller simen.f.k.h@student.bi.no.  
 
Med vennlig hilsen  
 
Joakim Lindberg og Simen Karlsen  
Handelshøyskolen BI, i samarbeid med Fagsekretariatet for 
bedriftshelsetjenesten ved NIOH  
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Appendix 4 – Response rate 
 
Appendix 5 – CFA Measurement model standardized regression coefficients 
 
 
Date 05.05.2011 06.05.2011 07.05.2011 09.05.2011 10.05.2011 11.05.2011 12.05.2011 13.05.2011 16.05.2011 18.05.2011 19.05.2011 Total
Number of respondents 59 16 2 18 4 37 11 6 3 4 1 161
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Appendix 6 – CFA Measurement model t-values 
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Appendix 7 – CFA Improved Measurement model standardized regression 
coefficients 
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Appendix 8 – Recoded Measurement model standardized regression coefficients 
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Appendix 9 – SEM external OHS standardized regression coefficients 
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Appendix 10 – SEM internal OHS standardized regression coefficients 
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Appendix 11 – SEM external OHS t-values 
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Appendix 12 – SEM internal OHS t-values 
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Appendix 13 – SEM without Performance Ambiguity external OHS units t-
values 
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Appendix 14 – SEM without Performance Ambiguity internal OHS units t-
values 
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Chapter 1 Background for the study 
The background for the study is the new law regulations that amended 1st of 
January 2010. This new regulations requires new branches of the Norwegian 
industry to offer Occupational Health Services (OHS) to their employees. The 
focus of the study is to investigate how OHS units gain price premiums, given 
these new conditions. Throughout the paper, we examine this phenomenon from 
the business-to-business market perspective. In the study, we address two types of 
OHS units, wholly owned and independent actors. 
 
OHS units have traditionally had little attention on marketing of their services. 
Nevertheless, in the recent years, OHS units face the increased competition with 
larger private owned players entering the market. Therefore, we investigate which 
variables influences price premium. In result, we might discover how the OHS 
units adapt and respond to the competitive environment.   
 
 
Chapter 2 Properties of the Occupational Health Services market 
The OHS market in the Norwegian setting undergoes vast changes, even though 
the market dates back to the 17th century (Lie 2009).The modern OHS supplier 
dates back to 1977, when the Work Environment Act passed through (Lie 2009). 
Norwegian work environment legislation, aligned with rules and regulations in the 
European Union make up the framework for the industry. The regulation states 
that 1) The employer is responsible for having an OHS in place and assessing the 
quality of the OHS personnel and 2) Describes the types of services enterprises 
should require of an OHS. In Norway, two ministries are involved; the Ministry of 
Labor and Social Inclusion and the Ministry of Health and Welfare (Meeting with 
NIOH, 23.06 2010). 
 
Browsing the OHS market is an endearing task. The industry is multidisciplinary, 
meaning that some OHS units provide services to many enterprises. Both wholly 
owned and independent players make up the market. In an European context, 
Norwegian OHS companies are relatively small, with an average of four full time 
OHS professionals covering 2000 employees (Lie 2009). The OHS Registry, 
published by the National Institute of Occupational Health (NIOH), provides the 
closest estimate of number of players in the market. Now, around 410 OHS units 
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employ some 2500 professionals (NIOH 2010). It should be noted that the registry 
is voluntarily and therefore not completely accurate (Meeting with NIOH, 23.06 
2010). 
 
As mentioned, the Norwegian OHS industry focus little on marketing of their 
services, but focus on competing on prices. The reason for this might be that law 
regulates the industry. Lately, two trends have developed in the market; 1) OHS 
units merge, and as such larger players enters the market and 2) The OHS units 
and market as a whole moves towards commercialization. Hence, marketing and 
pricing structures becomes more important. As of recent, pricing structures moves 
towards a basic price and a price by the hour (Meeting with NIOH, 23.06 2010). 
These trends have led to an increase in competition in the market. In order to stay 
competitive OHS units change their organizational structure from non-profit 
organizations to public companies.  
 
As of January 1st 2010, two new regulations were introduced. Firstly, the 
introduction of accreditation of providers of OHS, and secondly introduction of 
industry regulation for new sectors of the Norwegian market (Norwegian Labour 
Inspection Authority 2010). New sectors that require offering OHS services to 
their employees include amongst others education, health care, and hairdressers 
(Norwegian Labour Inspection Authority 2010).  
 
Severe changes will occur in the marketplace due to these law amendments. 
International players and franchise units are likely to enter the market. These 
competitors with international background will be better at communicating the 
value of their services, and as such contribute to increased competition for 
existing OHS units. OHS units operating in the market now fear this competition. 
Traditionally, OHS units have not considered competition as a major threat. 
Therefore, they are likely to oppose these changes. The OHS units have not 
conveyed their added value to their customers. They have focused on price, and 
presenting it as the lowest possible cost for buyers. As such, the focus has only 
been on price and not on quality. In addition, the new law amendment poses some 
serious threats. Firstly, it forces buyers to select an OHS provider, which prohibits 
competition. Secondly, the lack of a competitive mechanism is likely to make 
OHS focus less on innovation and on operating efficiently. 
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Chapter 3 Problem definition 
Our problem definition stems from the fact that the industry, as mentioned, 
recently have gone through legal amendments. The study will focus on how this 
change in legal structure will affect the market. The financial crisis is 
strengthening the effects of price strategies. Hence, companies push their margins 
to the maximum. Therefore, we propose the following research question: 
 
 “Given the new law regulations, which factors in the OHS market contribute to 
some firms receiving price premiums in an increasingly competitive market?”  
 
3.1 Contribution 
This study will contribute by examining the effects of new legal amendments in 
the OHS market. We postulate that these legal changes will alter how companies 
can gain price premiums. Moreover, we argue that in order to face competition 
from the international arena, OHS units must focus on other aspects than price. 
Until recently, price has been the common denominator for competing in the 
market, reducing the incentive to compete. International competitors on the other 
hand have vast experience on creating value and signaling quality. By examining 
price premium, this paper can help OHS units reflect on how to compete in the 
market. 
 
3.2 Limitations 
Limitations will be defined when we have a more complete and thorough picture 
of the subject. 
 
 
Chapter 4 Literature Review 
The purpose of the literature review is to develop a research model, hence the 
chapter begins with reviewing theories that has an impact on our model. We will 
first look at the dependent variable, price premium, before examining the 
independent variables respectively. Each of the independent variables will have a 
related hypothesis that we will address in the final paper.  
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4.1 Dependent variable  
We examine why some actors in the OHS market charge higher prices for their 
services compared to their competitors. Aligned with this frame of mind we base 
our study on the dependent variable price premium. Rao and Monroe (1996) 
define price premium as “the difference between the super-high price and the 
perfectly competitive price for high-quality output”. In essence, focus on quality 
will increase revenue and lead to higher profits (Babakus, Beinstock, and Van 
Scotter 2004). Furthermore, Klein and Leffler (1981) argue that the high prices 
accrue to sellers in the form of above-average profits. Price premiums differ from 
premium prices. Premium prices are considerably above average reflecting the 
higher cost of producing high quality, but may not necessarily provide profits to 
sellers (Rao and Bergen 1992). 
 
A main rationale for price premium is that of information asymmetry (Rao and 
Bergen 1992). Information asymmetry stems upon the notion that not all buyers 
possess all information about the quality of the services provided (Akerlof 1970). 
This imply that the supplier have more information about the object of an 
exchange compared to the buyer (Mishra, Heide, and Cort 1998, 277). 
 
Given the new law regulations in the OHS market, more companies must select an 
OHS provider. Therefore, information asymmetry can occur in the selected 
marketplace between buyer and seller. The situation where a seller possesses more 
information than the buyer can result in opportunistic behavior. When such 
situations arise, two problems exist: adverse selection and moral hazard. In terms 
of adverse selection, suppliers do not possess the skills required to provide certain 
quality levels (Mishra, Heide, and Cort 1998). There might be instances where 
OHS customers cannot identify whether an OHS unit provides sufficient quality 
or not. 
 
Moral hazard occurs when suppliers easily influence the level of quality provided 
for each transaction (Mishra, Heide, and Cort 1998). In addition, moral hazard 
arises because suppliers have to ability and motivation to reduce the quality. The 
motivation for an OHS unit to cheat occurs because companies searching for an 
OHS unit do not necessarily have sufficient information. Therefore, companies 
pay a price premium to reduce the risk of cheating.  
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Linked with information asymmetry theory, is the theory of information 
economics. Nelson (1970) developed a framework for how difficult it is to 
evaluate services based on their properties. He classifies “search” services as 
types where quality can be determined prior to purchase. In “experience” services, 
quality can only be determined after purchase and usage (Darby and Karni 1973).  
Darby and Karni (1973) added a third category to Nelson’s framework: 
“credence” qualities. It refers to services where quality is not necessarily possible 
to evaluate even after purchase and consumption. This is due to the high required 
level of knowledge to understand what the service does.  Since OHS units offer 
services that are hard to evaluate, they classify as credence services. Because of 
this, an incentive for OHS units is to cheat by offering unnecessary services for an 
extra fee. 
 
4.2 The mediating role of wholly owned and independent OHS actors 
The purpose of this study is to examine the underlying reason for why some actors 
in the OHS market can charge price premium. In order to fully understand and 
explain the differences, we distinguish between wholly owned and independent 
OHS actors, using this as a mediating variable. In that manner, we test why and 
how such effects occur based on the independent variables (Baron and Kenny 
1986). We believe that there exist moderating differences between wholly owned 
and independent actors that will provide us with more insight. Further, these 
differences can be important to investigate in order to enhance learning. 
 
Wholly owned actors do not serve other companies than its owner. This is more 
common for large enterprises such as Aker Kværner Subseas AS, as they can 
achieve economies of scale. Independent OHS actors on the other hand 
characterizes as entities serving several companies at the same time. Aleris AS 
stands as an example of an independent actor.  
 
 
4.3 Independent variables with hypotheses 
4.3.1 Quality and Price premium 
According to Zeithaml (1988, 3) quality is defined as “superiority or excellence”. 
A more general definition are proposed from American Society for Quality (2010) 
GRA 19002 Master Thesis  1.9.2011 
Page 6 
which define quality as “the characteristics of a product or service that bear on 
its ability to satisfy stated or implied needs”. With other words, quality is an 
essential aspect for customers making a choice. Quality is therefore also important 
for actors to stay competitive, sustain over time and differentiate themselves from 
competition. In the market of health services, quality is of vital importance. 
Especially after the change of the law regulations, enabling OHS companies to 
compete against each other in an open market (Norwegian Labour Inspection 
Authority 2010). Hence, competition moves to the open market with immense 
opportunities. As a result, quality will be an important factor for companies 
deciding on their choice of an OHS unit. 
 
Since a typical OHS unit consists of several positions such as nurses, ergonomists 
and physicians (Lie 2009), quality evaluation can be different depending on the 
interactions in the treatment process. Therefore, it might be hard to evaluate the 
overall quality of an OHS unit. In addition, quality in respect of OHS may be hard 
to evaluate after treatment because it is a credence service (Darby and Karni 
1973). 
 
Moreover, perceived quality is also a major factor in regards of choosing OHS 
units, because service quality forms by prior experiences. Hence, it refers to the 
customer’s judgment of the superiority or excellence. Keller (2003, 238) defines 
perceived service quality as “the customers perception of the overall quality or 
advantage of a service relative to relevant alternatives and with respect to its 
intended purpose”. If OHS units deliver quality below the expectations from the 
customers point of view, this could result in lower expectations and satisfaction, 
thus reducing price premium. Although, this is only true if the customer have the 
possibility to evaluate all of the different OHS units in the marketplace. Hence, 
identify those who provide high quality and those who provide inferior quality, 
which is not always possible (Akerlof 1970). Finally, charging a higher price 
correlates with higher perceived quality as it enable a company to receive price 
premiums. Hence, customers tend to perceive higher price with higher quality 
(Keller 2003). Therefore, we propose the following: 
 
H1a: Given wholly owned OHS: The higher perceived quality, the greater 
likelihood to obtain a price premium 
GRA 19002 Master Thesis  1.9.2011 
Page 7 
H1b: Given independent OHS: The higher perceived quality, the greater 
likelihood to obtain a price premium 
 
4.3.2 Reputation and Price Premium 
As mentioned in terms of information asymmetry, buyers do not have sufficient 
information about OHS alternatives in the marketplace. Reputation might be one 
way for buyers to overcome this problem (Herbig and Milewicz 1993). Herbig 
and Milewicz (1993) define reputation as “the estimation of the consistency over 
time of an attribute of an entity”.  
 
Due to lack of information, potential buyers use reputation as a tool to evaluate 
the overall quality of OHS units. However, reputation might also come with a bag 
of hurt. On one side, reputation might be valuable if handled correctly, but it may 
also be fragile. Once destroyed, it takes hard work to rebuild a reputation. It is 
important that OHS units use reputation as a part of their strategy only if the 
reward outpaces the costs, as rebuilding a reputation can be a costly process 
(Herbig and Milewicz 1993).  
 
In addition, reputation occurs primarily through market signaling, meaning “an 
action that the parties can take to reveal their true types” (Herbig and Milewicz 
1993; Kirmani and Rao 2000). In essence, market signaling helps identify 
procedures unknown for the buyers because the motives of a potential seller can 
be unknown or hidden. In the OHS market, this can be a problem, when the buyer 
does not have sufficient information about OHS alternatives. This is one of the 
problems with asymmetric information (Akerlof 1970). Hence, market signaling 
might increase reputation and prevent opportunistic behavior, since its purpose is 
to reduce uncertainty and information asymmetry. Therefore, we propose the 
following: 
 
H2a: Given wholly owned OHS: The higher degree of reputation, the greater 
likelihood to obtain a price premium 
 
H2b: Given independent OHS: The higher degree of reputation, the greater 
likelihood to obtain a price premium 
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4.3.3 Punishment and Price Premium 
Punishment follows the notion that OHS units will have an incentive to cheat, by 
providing poor quality. This can occur if the buyers do not have the opportunity or 
ability to punish the seller. If sellers can cheat the customer, they are likely to earn 
above-average profits by charging a price premium. The ultimate punishment an 
OHS unit can receive is that the buyer stops purchasing their services. Obviously 
if buyers punish the seller, they will lose all future profits (Rao and Bergen 1992). 
Recent trends in the OHS market show that buyers change their OHS units more 
frequently (Meeting NIOH 2010, 23.06 2010). This could be due to such cheating. 
Because we deal with a credence service, evaluating cheating is a problem. As 
such, punishment is an important variable in the OHS market. Given that the 
buyer cannot punish the seller, there is a clear incentive of obtaining price 
premiums in the marketplace. Rao and Bergen (1992) argue that buyers reward 
honest sellers with price premiums and punish dishonest sellers by denying them 
future sales. Therefore, we propose the following: 
 
H3a: Given wholly owned OHS: The higher level of price premiums increases to 
the degree which buyers do not punish cheating 
 
 
H3b: Given independent OHS: The higher level of price premiums increases to 
the degree which buyers do not punish cheating 
 
4.3.5 Brand Investment and Price Premium 
When other factors such as reputation and quality are lacking or hard to evaluate, 
branding can serve as a promise to the customer (Erdem and Swait 1998). This is 
based upon the notion that the brand will convey and confirm the seller as the 
responsible body in a given transaction. The American Marketing Association 
defines brand as a “name, term, design, symbol, or any other feature that 
identifies one seller's good or service as distinct from those of other sellers” 
(American Marketing Association 2010). 
 
In the OHS industry today, the tendencies of merging companies can effectively 
create bigger organization with stronger corporate brands. This will make it harder 
for smaller brands to compete in the market (Meeting with NIOH 2010, 23.06 
2010). In addition, it is likely that companies will use more money on brand 
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investments, to set themselves apart in a more competitive market. OHS units 
with strong brands also have less incentive to cheat the customer as it would 
effectively damage brand equity, reputation, and ultimately put future profits at 
risk (Rao and Monroe 1996). The more the company has spent on brand 
investments, the more risk the company face by cheating the buyer. As a result, 
companies will use brand investments such as advertising to convey their name, 
making it easier for buyers to select in the market and keep a promise of quality. 
Evidently, a strong brand reduces the risk for the buyers and makes selection 
easier, which could lead to price premiums (Keller 2008, 7). The effect of brand 
investment should be that the branded companies gain a price premium (Erdem 
and Swait 1998). The notion follows that enhancing the brand informs consumers 
about the presence of price premiums; as such it will be accepted by the purchaser 
(Klein and Leffler 1981). Therefore, we propose the following: 
 
H4a1: Given wholly owned OHS: The higher the degree of brand investment, the 
greater likelihood to obtain a price premium 
 
H4a2: Given independent OHS: The higher the degree of brand investment, the 
greater likelihood to obtain a price premium 
 
Brand Investments can also lead to credibility. Erdem and Swait (2002) define 
brand credibility as “the believability of the product information contained in a 
brand, which requires that consumers perceive that the brand have the ability 
(i.e., expertise) and willingness (i.e., trustworthiness) to continuously deliver what 
has been promised”. Furthermore, Erdem and Swait (1998) argue that brand 
credibility is an important choice criterion for buyers. Increasing brand 
investments will likely increase brand credibility, and as such make it easier for 
customers to choose even though price premiums exist in the market. Therefore, 
we propose the following: 
 
H4b1: Given wholly owned OHS:  The higher the degree of brand credibility, the 
greater likelihood to obtain a price premium 
 
H4b2: Given independent OHS: The higher the degree of brand credibility, the 
greater likelihood to obtain a price premium 
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Chapter 5 Research Model 
Based on our literature review, we propose the following research model, 
consisting of price premium as dependent variable and quality, reputation, 
punishment and brand investment as independent variables. We want to capture 
which variables that allows some OHS units to receive price premium in the 
market and others not. In order to examine this, we distinguish between wholly 
owned and independent OHS units as a mediating variable.  
 
 
 
 
Model 1: Conceptual model 
 
Chapter 6 Research Methodology 
We have already conducted an interview with Trygve Lie and Odd Bjørnstad at 
the National Institute of Occupational Health. The information gained in this 
interview, forms as a basis when selecting our variables. The research context for 
our study is OHS units. We will both capture wholly owned and independent OHS 
units, and therefore provide a more nuanced view of the market, that again will 
strengthen the validity of our research. 
 
This industry captures the essence of what we want to study. First, the reason for 
choosing suppliers of OHS in our study is the fact that we will gain valuable 
information from industry experts, which complement the academic literature in a 
prosperous manner. Second, OHS industry has traditionally had little focus on 
marketing their services, instead focusing on price competition due to law 
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regulations. Therefore, it is of great interest to analyze how OHS units adapt to the 
new law regulations. Finally, OHS units’ organizational structure changes from 
non-profit organizations to public companies in order to stay competitive. Hence, 
we study which factors in the OHS market that have an impact on receiving price 
premium in the market.  
 
We believe that studying this sector will give suitable data to the research model. 
When analyzing the OHS market, the goal is to discover how one can actively 
manage pricing strategy within a business-to-business market, in a period of 
economic recession. Companies reduce the cost, and OHS services are one of the 
areas where this might occur. 
 
6.1 Data collection 
The OHS Registry forms the basis of our survey sample. Consisting of some 410 
business units, the registry should provide us with an acceptable sample size. As 
this registry is maintained by NIOH, we believe that the likelihood of a good 
response rate increases. The registry will also provide us with contact details to 
key informants employed in the different OHS units. Ahead of the data collection, 
our supervisor will attend a conference, announcing the survey. Hopefully, this 
marketing will contribute to a higher response rate. Surveys often get a higher 
response rate, when a pre-notification and a university are involved in the study 
(Fox, Crask, and Kim 1988). Because of these factors, it makes us even more 
convinced that the rate will be acceptable.  
 
We want to make a sample randomization of the OHS registry, both within the 
wholly owned and independent OHS units in order to hinder biased estimates. 
Moreover, we also randomize the sample to ensure that the variables do not 
correlate with the error term or between the independent variables. This will 
ensure higher internal validity of our data (Pedhazur and Schmelkin 1991, 222-
223). 
6.2 Procedure 
We will collect data by distributing a digital questionnaire to the key informants e-
mail addresses. The questionnaire will be composed in an online survey tool using 
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Questback or Confirmit to both minimize response error and facilitate data 
analysis. The reasons for using a digital questionnaire are its advantages such as 
low cost and easy distribution across a vast geographical distance.  
In order to ensure the credibility of the study, we will include both the logo of The 
Norwegian School of Management and the logo of the National Institute of 
National Health, in the cover letter. In addition, contact details are included, so 
respondents can contact us if they have any questions or comments. We will also 
include two automated reminders, in order to ensure that we collect as many 
answers as possible. This is done in order to avoid a low respondent percentage 
that often poses problems when dealing with digital surveys. The reminders will 
be sent out the first and second week after the survey has been launched.   
Thereafter, we will use statistical tools such as SPSS/JMP and LISREL to analyze 
and interpret the data. 
6.3 Pretest 
There will be conducted a quantitative pretest of our survey in order to ensure that 
the operationalization of variables are valid and understandable for the 
respondents. We test this on a small sample taken from the OHS registry, quality 
assured by NIOH representatives. In addition, by performing a pretest we ensure 
that we obtain reliable measures regarding the statistics. Lastly, we make sure that 
the respondents understand our questionnaire before we send out the final version. 
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Chapter 7 Limitations of the research 
This study has a number of limitations. Firstly, the research data will be collected 
from a voluntarily based registry, which means that we will only get respondents 
that themselves have actively shown interest in the registry. This could harm the 
randomization of our research resulting in biased estimates. Secondly, the registry 
only includes around 400 OHS units. Depending on the respondent rate there is a 
threat that our sample will be small, making it harder to obtain valid results from 
our statistical analysis. Thirdly, we will only get in touch with one respondent 
from each OHS unit. This could be problematic as the user may give biased 
estimates when responding on behalf of the unit. It could for instance occur when 
we ask about the quality of services provided. With such questions, it is likely that 
the respondents will give “correct” answers, and not act completely objective.  
Fourthly, the length of the questionnaire might present itself as a limitation. It 
should be neither too short nor too long. Lastly, the digital questionnaires require 
simple questions and a simple setup to be comprehensive for the respondents. 
This might harm the “deepness “of knowledge obtained from the data. 
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Appendices  
Appendix 1: Progression plan 
Month Task 
February Recieve feedback on preliminary. Correct preliminary 
March Develop questions for questionnaire and operalization 
April Carry through survey, and collect data 
May Interpretation and analysis of data 
June Interpretation and analysis of data 
July Interpretation and analysis of data.  
August Write results and corrections 
September Hand in 1st of september 
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